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INCIDENTAL SEARCH MAY 
PRECEDE ARREST WHILE 
REMAINING LAWFUL 
R. v. Sinclair, 2005 MBCA 41 
 
Two police officers saw a 
vehicle pull into a donut shop 
parking lot at 1:00 am and park. 
A male approached the car, 
reached in through an open 
window, engaged in some sort of transaction, and 
then left. The car then departed and one of the 
officers thought he had just witnessed a drug 
transaction based on his experience, the 
circumstances, and the location. The police 
followed the car and the licence plate check was 
blank. Thinking the car might be stolen, the 
officers stopped it, but the accused could not 
produce a licence or identification. He was asked 
to step from the car and the officer observed 
two balls of rolled up tinfoil, thought to be crack 
cocaine, in the middle of the driver’s seat. A cell 
phone could also be heard ringing. 
 
The officer escorted the accused to his police 
unit, patted him down, and found cash on him. 
The officer returned to the car, seized the two 
tin foil balls and the cell phone. The tinfoil was 
opened and found to contain cocaine. The 
accused was arrested for trafficking in cocaine 
and possession of proceeds of crime. A couple 
hours later two calls were received on the cell 
phone ordering cocaine.  
 
At trial the judge concluded that the police had 
reasonable grounds to arrest the accused when 
they saw the tinfoil balls in the car before the 
search took place. However, he found the search 
  
 
illegal because it was warrantless and neither 
incidental to detention or arrest. In his view, the 
police should have applied for a search warrant. 
The search and seizure was unreasonable and the 
evidence was excluded under s.24(2). The 
accused was acquitted.  
 
The Crown appealed to the Manitoba Court of 
Appeal arguing that the trial judge erred. 
Justice Freedman, authoring the unanimous 
judgment, agreed with the trial judge that the 
police had reasonable grounds to arrest the 
accused before the search took place. He 
stated: 
 
The combination of the suspicious events in 
the parking lot, the tin foil balls which were in 
plain view of the officer, his informed 
suspicion and thought (far more than a mere 
hunch) that it was crack cocaine, the ringing 
cell phone, the time of day, all against the 
backdrop of the officer's experience, and the 
previous event in the parking lot, all provide a 
sufficient evidentiary foundation for the 
conclusion. [para. 14] 
 
However, the Manitoba Court of Appeal 
disagreed with the trial judge and found the 
search lawful as an incident to arrest. Although 
searches incidental to arrest usually follow an 
arrest, “a search prior to arrest will still be 
incidental to the arrest provided that prior to 
the search there were reasonable…grounds for 
the arrest,” Justice Freedman stated. The fact 
the search and seizure preceded the arrest was 
not relevant to the lawfulness of the search in 
this case. There was no s.8 violation and the 
evidence was admissible. The acquittal was set 
aside and a new trial was ordered. 
 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org 
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 ‘IN SERVICE: 10-8’ 
e-LETTERS TO THE EDITOR 
 
Here are some of our 
readers’ comments about 
the publication.  
************ 
“Just a quick note to 
thank you for the…newsletter. It's a valuable 
resource, and I look forward to continuing to 
receive it. I've taken the liberty of distributing 
it to members…Some may be in touch requesting 
that their names be added to the distribution 
list. Again, thanks for staying in touch!”—Police 
Inspector, Ontario 
************ 
“I'm interested in receiving your publications…I 
spent approximately 5 years at our College 
instructing on a variety of topics.  Although I am 
no longer teaching I'm still very interested in 
receiving your newsletter.”—Staff Sergeant, 
Ontario  
************ 
“I have read my first copy of your newsletter.  
It is very impressive, please add me to your 
list.”—Government Employee, Ontario 
************ 
“Every now and then an issue [of In Service: 10-
8] pops up in my parade room and I always find it 
to be a good learning source.”—Police Constable, 
British Columbia  
************ 
“The 10-8 newsletter is outstanding”—Police 
Constable, British Columbia 
 
All past editions of this 
newsletter are available online 
by clicking on the Police 
Academy link at:  
www.jibc.bc.ca 
 
 
Note-able Quote 
 
A criminal trial is not a quest for the truth, but 
rather a search for admissible evidence—author 
unknown 
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Managing Your Workforce:  
The Risks1 
Paul Ceyssens2 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The increased prominence and complexity of 
managing human resources issues in the police 
workplace requires a periodic examination of 
both the extent of legal risk and the appropriate 
measures to manage that risk. This paper, and 
my presentation at the conference, is intended 
to provide one such examination, and proposes to 
do so by answering three questions: (i) what is 
risk management?; (ii) how should the legal risk 
be managed generally?; and (iii) what are the 
most effective specific strategies? 
 
Given the brief time allotted for the 
presentation, I have elected to restrict my 
comments to managing human resources issues 
that are connected with the law of human rights. 
There are other important aspects of managing 
human resources issues – the complaint and 
discipline process is one prominent example – but 
a discussion of those topics should await another 
day. 
 
Any reflection of this sort is necessarily 
coloured in some fashion by the background of 
the observer, and my biography has been 
circulated. With that caveat, I will proceed to 
address these three questions. 
 
WHAT IS RISK MANAGEMENT? 
 
(a) Why Worry About It? 
 
The starting point in addressing this first 
question is to reflect upon the purposes of risk 
management. In other words, we should ask why 
it matters before we determine how best it 
                                                 
1 Presentation to CACP “Operational Challenges in Managing Human Resources” 
Conference March 20-22, 2005—Vancouver, B.C. 
2  Of the Bars of British Columbia and Ontario. All rights reserved. Parts of this 
paper have relied on a draft of an article coauthored by the writer to be 
submitted for publication. The writer may be contacted at pc@saltspring.com. 
 
should be performed. We believe the following 
are the principal objectives of risk management: 
 
1. improve service delivery 
2. avoid financial costs arising from disputes 
3. avoid negative effects on organization arising 
from disputes (“organizational disruption” or 
“organizational distraction”) 
4. avoid negative effects on individuals arising 
from disputes 
5. avoid damage to reputation of the 
constabulary generally 
6. win disputes that do occur despite your best 
efforts 
7. lose small if the result is unfavourable 
 
(b) Management of Legal Analysis: The 
Analysis 
 
Opinions vary concerning the proper approach to 
managing legal risk. Our firm generally restricts 
its practice to employment law and human rights 
law, and provides advice to employers, 
executives, unions, individuals, governing bodies, 
oversight bodies and governments. We provide 
advice in various sectors across Canada, including 
policing. We also provide extensive training in 
the management of legal risk and other areas. 
Both in our formal legal advice and in our 
training, we favour a three-stage approach on 
the issue of risk management. 
 
The first stage involves assessing trends. 
Organizations and individuals in particular 
sectors should be aware of the general direction 
of both courts of law and administrative 
tribunals3 in matters of significance. That 
knowledge should be supplemented by awareness 
of important developments as they occur. As 
well, assessment of trends should be not only 
historical (to be aware of decisions that have 
been rendered by courts and administrative 
tribunals), but also prospective – organizations 
and individuals should have a sense of the likely 
direction of future trends. Among other things, 
                                                 
3 Two examples of administrative tribunals that affect policing are police 
discipline tribunals and human rights tribunals. 
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complex litigation often takes many years to 
resolve, and a formal proceeding commenced 
today may be decided five or more years from 
now when the judiciary’s approach to a particular 
issue may be different. The time to make an 
educated assessment as to where the courts will 
be in five years is before a decision is taken on a 
complex matter, or on a general policy direction. 
The following considerations, while not 
exhaustive, apply to trends in human rights 
issues that arise in the police workplace: (i) the 
past twenty years has seen a higher number of 
formal legal proceedings than has historically 
been the case; (ii) many of these proceedings are 
unprecedented (“cutting-edge” cases); (iii) 
judgment has been awarded against the police in 
various significant decisions; (iv) in some cases, 
the total of damage awards, legal fees and other 
costs is extremely large; (v) other cases follow 
on the heels of precedent-setting cases; (vi) 
various human rights cases have attracted 
considerable unfavourable publicity. 
 
The second stage in the analysis involves 
assessing the extent to which these legal trends 
affect risk. In the case of human rights issues in 
the police workplace (and legal issues generally in 
the police workplace), it can safely be stated 
that risk has increased in the past fifteen years, 
such that organizations and individuals require an 
increased level of literacy in the area of risk 
management. Generally speaking, risk has 
increased measurably but not dramatically, 
although risk has increased considerably in 
respect of particular issues, some of which will 
be discussed below. 
 
The third stage in the analysis involves assessing 
the response to the increased risk. Various 
strategies are available, and they will also be 
discussed below. 
 
HOW SHOULD THE LEGAL RISK BE 
MANAGED GENERALLY? 
 
One of the essential distinctions in the 
management of legal risk is between reactive and 
proactive. Many organizations react to issues, 
problems and crises as they arise without 
devoting much attention to the rewards that 
proactive, preventive strategies can generate. 
 
The legal profession has seen considerable 
movement in recent years towards embracing 
preventive law. This trend is based on the 
common-sense observation that many problems 
can be foreseen before they occur, and 
strategies may be implemented to prevent the 
risk from materializing. Lawyers can bring 
enormous value to an organization by providing 
advice on prevention and avoidance, as distinct 
from the traditional model of seeking legal 
advice only when an adverse event has occurred. 
 
Organizations on various sectors have also moved 
to embrace the concept of prevention. One 
excellent example in Canada appears in a report 
entitled Building a Safer System: A National 
Integrated Strategy for Improving Patient 
Safety in Canadian Health Care, authored by the 
National Steering Committee on Patient Safety 
(the “Committee”)4. Although the report 
addresses risk management in the hospital 
sector, much of its analysis involves general 
principles that apply equally to the police 
workplace. The quality of this report is 
extremely impressive and it represents some of 
the most considered work undertaken in this 
regard in Canada. 
 
The report emphasizes the value of undertaking 
an exercise that proactively assesses structure, 
processes and outcomes to avoid what the 
Committee refers to as “preventible adverse 
events”. It borrows from successful risk-
management efforts in the airline industry in the 
United States: 
 
Aviation is an excellent example in which a 
high-risk industry implemented co-ordinated 
and comprehensive strategies to reduce 
preventable accidents. Also, the study of 
                                                 
4 See www.cpsi-icsp.ca for a PDF of the entire report, or call toll-free 1-866-421-
6933 for a paper copy. Permission to reproduce this material is gratefully 
appreciated. 
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human-factors engineering has led to an 
understanding that, although adverse events 
will occur in any human endeavor, they can be 
minimized through the design of equipment or 
tools, design of the tasks themselves, the 
environmental conditions of work, the training 
of staff, and the selection of workers. Airline 
regulators, plane manufacturers, and 
commercial airline carriers have combined 
human-factors engineering with the knowledge 
that failures in communication and co-
ordination among team members have led to 
tragic aviation accidents. Their collaboration 
resulted in a wide variety of mandatory and 
voluntary processes that have dramatically 
improved passenger safety.5 
 
This strategic approach applied to managing 
human resources in the police workplace would 
reduce risk quite considerably. Many 
“preventable adverse events” are easily 
predictable, and a comprehensive strategy 
applied proactively would reap measurable 
benefits. 
 
A survey of recent significant decisions 
concerning human resources in the police 
workplace (decided by courts of law, human 
rights tribunals, police discipline tribunals and 
arbitrators) provide easy examples of the 
predictability of events that have a high 
likelihood of contention. As well, a survey of 
relevant decisions shows that some mistakes – 
even basic mistakes – are consistently repeated. 
 
One area which has regularly produced litigation 
is the extent of an employer’s obligation under 
human rights legislation to accommodate 
employees. In the police workplace, this issue 
ordinarily arises in the context of an employee 
who suffers from a disability, or a pregnant 
employee. One author offers a succinct 
definition of accommodation: 
 
... the tailoring of a work rule, practice, 
condition or requirement to the specific needs 
of an individual or group. The need may be 
                                                 
5 National Steering Committee on Patient Safety, Building a Safer System: A 
National Integrated Strategyfor Improving Patient Safety in Canadian Health 
Care, p. 6. 
associated with their religion, gender, 
disability or other human attribute 
enumerated in human rights codes. An 
accommodation can include such steps as an 
exemption of the worker from an existing work 
requirement or condition applicable to others, 
the provision to the worker of a benefit not 
ordinarily or routinely provided to others, and 
the provision of some kind of job support or 
assistance ... The litmus test of the 
accommodation’s necessity is whether such a 
measure is needed to ensure that the worker 
can fully and equally participate in the 
workplace.6 
 
A person who believes that the employer has 
failed to provide accommodation may make an 
allegation of discrimination7.  
 
Complaints of pregnancy-related failure to 
accommodate arise regularly, despite two cases 
from the mid-1990s that exhaustively explored 
the extent of a police employer’s obligations in 
this regard.8 The result of the most recent 
reported case was likewise unfavourable to the 
employer.9 
 
                                                 
6 D. Lepofsky, “The Duty to Accommodate: A Purposive Approach” (1992), 1 Can. 
Lab. L.J. 1 at 3. The leading case on the issue of the obligation to provide 
accommodation in the context of employment is British Columbia Public Service 
Employee Relations Commission v. British Columbia Government and Service 
Employees’ Union, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 3 (the “B.C. Firefighter’s Case”). 
7 The concept of discrimination has various complexities, but the basic principles 
are as follows: (1) Discrimination is initially made out when three requirements 
are established: (i)“differential treatment”: the person alleging discrimination 
(the “complainant”) has been subjected to “differential treatment”, to his or her 
disadvantage; (ii) “protected area of activity”: the subject matter falls within 
certain “areas” of activity set out in the Human Rights Code, such as employment, 
services or housing; and (ii) “prohibited ground”: the basis for the differential 
treatment involved a “prohibited ground” of discrimination: age, sex, disability, 
family status, race, and various others, (2) Human rights legislation in all 
jurisdictions prohibit discrimination in employment on the basis of a prohibited 
ground. (3) A complainant who has established the three requirements – 
“differential treatment”, “protected area”, “prohibited ground” – is said to have 
established a “prima facie” case. (4) Where a complainant has made out a prima 
facie case, the burden shifts to the party facing the allegation (the 
“respondent”), who has various options, one of which is to raise a defence or 
exemption. For example, an applicant for police employment who is unsuccessful 
because he suffers from serious hearing impairment can easily establish a prima 
facie case, but case law has established that a police employer can raise the 
defence that a certain level of hearing ability is a legitimate occupational 
requirement for the position of constable. On the other hand, if an unsuccessful 
applicant suffering from asthma established a prima facie case of discrimination, 
the employer may have a difficult time raising a defence, since police officers 
commonly function well, despite their asthma, (5) Allegations of discrimination 
are adjudicated against the background of a large body of jurisprudence 
confirming that human rights law is to be interpreted in a “fair, large and liberal” 
fashion. 
8 Lord v. Haldimand-Norfolk Police Services Board (1995), 23 C.H.R.R. D/500 
(Ont. Bd. Inq.); Orangeville Police Association and Orangeville Police Services 
Board (1994), 40 L.A.C. (4th) 269 (Knopf). 
9 Saunders v. Kentville (Town), N.S. Bd. Inq., 20 August 2004. 
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Complaints of disability-related failure to 
accommodate arise frequently, and involve a 
broad range of afflictions. Examples include 
multiple sclerosis10, learning disabilities11 and 
diabetes.12 The cutting-edge issue in 
accommodation in the police workplace (and 
other workplaces) involves whether an employer 
owes an obligation to “cobble together” 
responsibilities from various positions in order to 
create a tailored position for a police officer 
suffering from disability. Such cases invariably 
involve issues of complexity and sensitivity, and 
several decisions unfavourable to the employer 
have been rendered so far.13 
 
There is an abundant supply of decisions in 
human rights-related complaints – whether they 
are brought under human rights legislation, the 
Police Act, the Charter or the grievance 
arbitration process – based on discrimination 
outside of accommodation. Racially inappropriate 
or sexually inappropriate language14 or 
treatment15 is a common source of formal legal 
proceedings. 
 
WHAT ARE THE MOST EFFECTIVE 
STRATEGIES? 
 
As noted above, the third stage of the approach 
we recommend to manage legal risk involves 
assessing what preventive strategies are 
available to reduce risk. 
 
The first important preventive strategy, and 
perhaps the most important, involves careful 
recruitment. Given the extent to which courts of 
law and other tribunals are now closely 
scrutinizing police conduct, police employers 
                                                 
10 Krznaric v. Chevrette (1997), 154 D.L.R. (4th) 527, 98 C.L.L.C. 230-004 (Ont. 
Gen. Div.). 
11 Justice Institute of British Columbia v. British Columbia (Attorney General) 
(1999), 17 Admin. L.R. (3d) 267, 99 C.L.L.C. 230-023 (B.C. S.C.). 
12 Barnard v. Fort Frances (Town) Board of Commissioners of Police (1987), 9 
C.H.R.R. D/4845 (Ont. Bd. Inq.). 
13 Essex Police Services Board and Essex Police Association (Horoky), 26 April 
2002 (Goodfellow); Halifax Regional Municipality and Municipal Association of 
Police Personnel (Smith) (2002), 104 L.A.C. (4th) 232 (Outhouse); Akwesasne 
Police Association and the Mohawk Council of Akwesasne, 2002 (Chapman). 
14 Examples include Monaghan and Toronto Police, O.C.C.P.S., 1 May 2003; Deviney 
and Toronto Police, O.C.C.P.S., 10 February 1999; Drennan and Hamilton-
Wentworth Regional Police (1996), 2 P.L.R. 444 (O.C.C.P.S.). 
15 Examples include Clark v. Canada, [1994] 3 F.C. 323; Lewin and Toronto Police 
(2001), 3 O.P.R. 1472 (O.C.C.P.S.). 
should obtain all possible relevant data that will 
allow an informed decision concerning the 
suitability of an applicant for employment. 
Particular emphasis should be paid to conducting 
both a thorough background investigation and 
administering psychological testing, including a 
clinical interview for all candidates. Our firm 
regularly sees lack of rigour in the recruitment 
process, including cases where police officers 
with notorious employment histories resign and 
promptly thereafter begin employment with 
another police force16. The issue of careful 
recruitment also arises post-appointment, when 
decisions are made concerning the selection of 
those in charge of human resources, professional 
standards and many other important positions 
within the organization. 
 
The second important preventive strategy is 
legal training. Organizations and individuals need 
to know about developments as they occur, lest 
they adopt a course of action that a court of law 
or administrative tribunal has already examined 
and criticized. In some workplaces, even 
decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada take 
several years to implement17, and such delay 
involves the unnecessary assumption of 
significant risk. 
 
The third important preventive strategy is policy 
development and “standard setting”. This means 
that appropriate policies are crafted, that they 
are updated as necessary and that employees 
receive training on the content of the policies. 
Lawyers who practice in this area of the law can 
readily identify workplaces in which employees 
are aware of the standards, and establishment 
and enforcement of such standards quickly 
repays an employer’s investment. 
 
The fourth important preventive strategy is 
competent supervision. Increased expectations 
                                                 
16 See J. Middleton-Hope, Gypsy Cops: An Analysis of the Level of Conduct of 
Previously Experienced Police Officers (Unpublished Master’s Thesis, University 
of Calgary, 2002). 
17 See, for example, T. Tyler, “Cheating Lawyers Called Criminals” Toronto Star 
(on-line edition), 18 November 2002, quoting a senior prosecutor: “‘Knowledge of 
the law has not filtered into the police community as it should have.’ Sheriff said 
it usually ‘takes about three years’ for information about court decisions that 
have changed the law to be fully absorbed by the police”. 
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on the part of courts of law and administrative 
tribunals requires that supervisors be carefully 
selected and properly trained. Even if 
promotional practices are sufficiently rigourous, 
risk will be unnecessarily increased where 
successful candidates do not receive supervisory 
training that will allow them to function in a 
fashion that will protect themselves personally, 
and their employers corporately. In the United 
States, there has been much emphasis in the 
development of early intervention systems as 
part of implementing effective supervision18, and 
some police forces in this country are beginning 
to rely upon early intervention systems. 
 
The fifth important preventive strategy is legal 
advice. Some police employers have established 
in-house legal counsel, while others use private 
sector counsel offering expertise in this area of 
the law. Ideally, lawyers will offer advice not 
only in response to matters that arise, but 
advice to reduce the likelihood of problems 
arising in the first place. 
 
Even where it is not possible to prevent an 
adverse event—and even the most refined risk 
management strategy will not reduce risk to 
zero—risk can still be reduced by examining 
whether practices such as mediation or other 
informal resolution of complaints are appropriate 
to assist in resolving an issue. 
 
Effective implementation of these strategies—
and there are other effective proactive 
strategies—will serve to reduce risk at a time 
when courts of law and other bodies are 
examining the conduct of police as closely as 
they ever have. 
 
Note-able Quote 
 
We need to lead the people we have. Not the 
people we used to have. Not the people we 
wished we had. But the people we have—author 
unknown 
                                                 
18 See, for example, S. Walker, Early Intervention Systems for Law Enforcement 
Agancies: A Planning and Management Guide (U.S. Dept. of Justice, 2003), 
available at www.cops.usdoj.gov. 
 
COURTHOUSE SECURITY 
SEARCH REASONABLE 
R. v. Campanella,  
(2005) Docket:C39402 (OntCA) 
 
The accused attempted to 
enter a courthouse to appear 
on a drug charge. Before 
passing through the metal 
detector at the entrance to 
the courthouse, she passed her purse over to a 
special constable who opened it and saw a baggie 
of marihuana. She was arrested and charged 
under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act 
with possession.  
 
At her trial in the Ontario Court of Justice, the 
accused argued she was subjected to an 
unreasonable search and seizure under s.8 of the 
Charter when her purse was inspected. Justice 
Cooper found the search reasonable and 
convicted the accused, which was affirmed on 
appeal by the Ontario Superior Court of Justice. 
The appeal judge found there had been no 
search since the security screening procedures 
did not infringe upon a reasonable expectation of 
privacy. Furthermore, even if there was a 
search, Justice Cavarzan concluded no warrant 
was required and the search was authorized by a 
reasonable law and was carried out in a 
reasonable manner. The accused, however, 
launched a further appeal to the Ontario Court 
of Appeal.  
 
Assuming without deciding whether the accused 
had a reasonable expectation of privacy, Justice 
Rosenberg concluded on behalf of the unanimous 
Ontario Court of Appeal that the warrantless 
search of the purse did not violate s.8. First, he 
examined the security screening program at the 
courthouse and described the process as follows: 
 
Anyone without a security clearance must pass 
through metal detectors. The person seeking 
entrance is asked whether they have any metal 
in their pockets. Bags and purses that contain 
metal are searched manually.  Police officers, 
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lawyers, court officials and court staff have 
security clearances.  The purpose of the 
security check is to ensure that no one 
entering the courthouse has any offensive, 
restricted or prohibited weapon or anything 
that could be used as a weapon.  A person in 
possession of an illegal weapon will be 
arrested.  A person in possession of an object 
that could be used as a weapon, such as a pen 
knife, is given the option of leaving the building 
or surrendering the item for later destruction.  
If a person refuses to allow a search, he or 
she is asked to leave the building. A person in 
the security line can turn back at any time and 
return without items he or she does not wish 
to be examined. The person can even pause to 
transfer non-metallic objects from hand 
baggage to a pocket that will not be searched. 
 
There are signs at all the public entrances to 
the courthouse that read as follows: NOTICE 
TO THE PUBLIC [.] ALL PERSONS WISHING 
TO ENTER THIS COURT FACILITY WILL BE 
SUBJECT TO A SECURITY SEARCH. NO 
PERSON IN POSSESSION OF A WEAPON 
OR AN ARTICLE THAT COULD BE 
DANGEROUS TO THE PUBLIC PEACE WILL 
BE ALLOWED ENTRY INTO THIS COURT 
FACILITY. PERSONS IN POSSESSION OF 
ILLEGAL ARTICLES WILL BE SUBJECT TO 
ARREST AND MAY BE CHARGED 
CRIMINALLY. 
 
The security check has a number of “levels”.  
First, all persons must pass through a metal 
detector.  Prior to going through the metal 
detector, the person is instructed to empty 
his or her pockets of any metal objects and 
the contents are visually inspected.  Second, 
all personal belongings that would set off the 
metal detector must be presented for manual 
inspection by special constables.  If the person 
still sets off the metal detector, a hand 
scanner is used.  A secondary search of the 
person can be done if the hand scanner is 
activated and there is a need to visually verify 
the cause of the activation.  A person of the 
same gender will perform the search in 
private.  At the time of the trial, no secondary 
search had been necessary.  Any person can 
refuse to enter the metal detector, present 
their belongings for inspection or submit to a 
secondary search and leave the building. Any 
person may retain non-metal objects in their 
pockets, in which case they would not be 
subject to inspection. [paras. 3-5] 
 
Second, the Ontario Court of Appeal considered 
the legislation involved. Under s.3(b) of Ontario’s 
Public Works Protection Act, a guard or peace 
officer “may search, without warrant, any person 
entering or attempting to enter a public work,” 
which includes “any provincial or municipal public 
building,” such as a courthouse. Section 137 of 
Ontario’s Police Services Act also provides that 
the police services board is responsible for 
courthouse security as well as ensuring the 
security of judges and persons participating in or 
attending court proceedings and persons in 
custody on or about the premises. This 
legislation was found to withstand constitutional 
muster. The law was designed to address a 
legitimate concern—the safety of all in the court 
complex. Justice Rosenberg noted:  
 
I start with the importance of the government 
objective.  It is notorious that, unfortunately, 
there have been serious incidents of violence 
in the courthouses of this province by the use 
of weapons that have been brought into the 
courthouse.  Court proceedings are emotionally 
intense.  Family, criminal and civil and litigation 
involves matters of great consequence to the 
parties and those associated with them.  The 
proceedings can provoke strong emotions.  
Everyone with business in the courthouse and 
ordinary members of the public have the right 
to expect that a courthouse will be a place of 
safety.  The public generally expects the 
government to ensure the safety of people who 
are either required or wish to attend court.  
We pride ourselves on having an open and 
transparent justice system.  A necessary 
incident of that system is that people who 
attend the courthouse to participate in or 
merely observe the proceedings will feel safe 
when they do so.  Most members of the public 
would expect the government to take 
reasonable measures to ensure the safety of 
the courtroom environment. [para. 18] 
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Moreover, the law was neither vague nor over-
reaching and the security procedures used were 
non-intrusive and bore no stigma. Nor would prior 
authorization based on reasonable grounds—
usually a pre-condition for a valid search and 
seizure—be feasible. Justice Rosenberg stated: 
 
The purpose of courthouse searches is to 
protect members of the public including 
litigants, witnesses, counsel, court officials 
and judges.  It is not reasonable to insist on 
prior judicial authorization to validate this 
governmental objective.  Over 1,000 people 
enter the Hamilton courthouse every day.  The 
security officials could not possibly obtain 
prior authorization from a judicial official to 
search even a small number of these people.  
In my view, given the importance of the 
government objective and the context in which 
these searches take place it is reasonable to 
authorize warrantless searches of those 
entering courthouse facilities. [para. 17] 
 
And further: 
 
First, courthouse searches like the one carried 
out in this case are not conducted for the 
purpose of criminal investigation.  The state 
and the individual are not antagonists in the 
same way that they are in a criminal 
investigation.  The search is not conducted for 
the purpose of enforcing the criminal law or 
investigating a criminal offence. 
 
Second, even if the person has a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in their personal 
belongings when entering a courthouse, that 
expectation is considerably diminished.  
Prominent signs warn everyone that they will 
be subjected to a security search and that 
they are not permitted to bring weapons or 
dangerous items into the courthouse.  
Regrettably, in this day and age, people expect 
that they will be subject to some kind of 
security screening when entering prominent 
public buildings such as courthouses or the 
Legislature.  These buildings, which are 
symbols of authority, are believed to be 
potential targets by some individuals and 
groups.  People reasonably expect that 
everyone without prior clearance will be 
searched on a non-discriminatory basis in a 
reasonable manner to ensure the safety of all 
persons in attendance at the building. 
 
Third, as the Crown points out, the persons 
being searched are also the beneficiaries of 
the process.  Like the security clearance at 
airports, the search provides reassurance to 
all members of the public that they will be 
safe from attack by persons with weapons 
within the confines of the courthouse despite 
the sometimes volatile nature of the 
proceedings. [paras. 22-24] 
 
Finally, the legislation in this context only 
authorized a search of persons entering the 
courthouse. It was not conducted in an 
unreasonable manner and there was no evidence 
of an ulterior motive unrelated to courthouse 
security. The appeal was dismissed. 
 
Complete case available at www.ontariociourts.on.ca 
 
INVESTIGATIVE DETENTION 
OK TO PREVENT OFFENCE 
R. v. Bilodeau,  
(2004) 192 CCC (3d) 110 (QueCA) 
 
At 3:55 am the police observed 
the accused driving a vehicle in a 
residential neighbourhood at a 
very slow speed with its brake 
lights flashing on and off. The 
passengers appeared to be looking for houses or 
an address. The vehicle pulled into a driveway 
and the engine was turned off and lights 
extinguished. The licence plate was checked on 
the computer and it was determined the owner 
of the vehicle did not live in the area. The 
officers were suspicious and had the impression 
the vehicle was driving slowly to check out the 
residential dwellings. About two minutes later 
the vehicle started up again, backed out of the 
driveway, drove down the roadway, and pulled 
into another driveway. The vehicle was then 
stopped because the officers believed they 
might be preventing the crime of theft and 
wanted to make enquiries. As a result of the stop 
the accused was charged with impaired driving 
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and over 80mg% after police obtained a breath 
reading of 340 mg%.  
At his trial in the Court of Quebec, the accused 
unsuccessfully argued that his rights under ss.8, 
9, and 10 of the Charter had been violated and 
that the evidence should be excluded. Although 
there was no doubt the police were not acting 
under the authority of Quebec’s Highway Safety 
Code when they stopped the accused, the trial 
judge found the police were acting under their 
duty to prevent crime. The accused was 
convicted of over 80mg% while a stay of 
proceedings was entered on the impaired charge.  
 
The accused, however, appealed to the Quebec 
Superior Court where his arguments were 
accepted and an acquittal was entered. Justice 
Grenier found the police decided to stop the 
accused prior to entering the second driveway 
and had no reasonable grounds to arrest him—
nobody exited the vehicle, forced a door or 
window to a residence, or lit a flashlight in the 
direction of a vehicle or house. The computer 
check revealed the accused neither had a 
criminal record nor any outstanding charges nor 
was the vehicle stolen. Nor did the registered 
owner living out of the area provide a 
constellation of discernible facts allowing them 
to detain the accused.  
 
The Crown then appealed to the Quebec Court 
of Appeal arguing the police officers believed 
they were in the presence of burglars and were 
exercising their powers under s.48 of Quebec’s 
Police Act, which requires officers to “maintain 
peace, order and public security, to prevent and 
suppress crime and…offences under the law and 
municipal by-laws, and to apprehend offenders.” 
The officers’ belief, the Crown contended, was 
based on the following: 
 
• the time (middle of night) 
• the location (in the residential quarter of a 
small village) 
• the unusual driving pattern (slow speed, 
constant braking) 
• stopping at the first residence 
• discovering the vehicle’s owner resided out of 
the area 
• the subsequent conduct of the occupants 
(including extinguishing the lights) 
• departure from the first driveway and 
entering the second driveway. 
 
The accused, on the other hand, countered that 
the officers’ suspicion that he was going to 
commit an offence was based only on a hunch. In 
testimony, the officer used words like 
“impression”, “suspicions”, “questions”, and 
“perhaps”, which did not meet the articulable 
cause standard necessary for a legitimate 
detention submitted the accused. In his view, 
the detention was not properly founded on 
objective grounds and was therefore arbitrary 
and the evidence should have been excluded. 
 
Justice Forget, writing the judgment for the 
Quebec Court of Appeal, concluded that the trial 
judge did not err and the police had “reasonable 
grounds to intervene in order to avoid an 
attempted breaking and entering in a residence 
during the course of the night.” After reviewing 
the case law on investigative detention, Justice 
Forget outlined five guiding principles to be 
applied to investigative detention cases: 
 
First of all, the hunch of a police officer 
which proves to be founded thereafter does 
not retroactively prove that he had 
reasonable grounds prior to acting. On the 
other hand, the grounds of police officers do 
not cease to be reasonable purely because 
follow-up events do not confirm what they 
had initially suspected… 
 
Secondly, the Court has to determine 
whether grounds are reasonable by placing 
itself in the circumstances with respect to 
time, place and the urgency which the police 
officers were confronted with, and not by a 
sophisticated analysis which is assisted by 
hindsight. 
 
Thirdly, the reasonable grounds often arise 
out of the overall circumstances. One should 
be careful not to dissect and analyze each 
element of proof separately. It may be that 
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each element is consistent with innocent 
conduct, whereas the overall picture points in 
quite a different direction. 
 
Fourthly, it is not always possible to 
determine with absolute precision at what 
time police officers believed they had 
reasonable grounds. With all due respect, it 
appears to me that the justice of the 
Superior Court -- by [a] posteriori analysis -- 
attached undue importance to the fact that 
the police officers decided to intervene 
prior to the vehicle entering the second 
driveway, when we know that all these events 
occurred within a very short period of time. 
 
Fifthly, we should not forget that police 
officers have a duty of prevention. Counsel 
for the [accused] wrote in his factum that 
the occupants of the vehicle made no 
attempt to enter into the residence at 161, 
rue Bilodeau. The role of police officers is 
not limited to arresting persons who commit 
crimes or who are attempting to commit 
crimes. This is all the more evident if one 
examines the situation from the point of 
view of citizens who reside at 161, rue 
Bilodeau. How could police officers have 
justified their failure to intervene if an 
attempted breaking and entering in their 
residence occurred during the night? When 
residents notice the presence of an 
automobile or a pickup parked in their private 
driveway during the night with its lights out, 
can they not contact the police? Would they 
then be prevented from carrying out an 
investigation? [para. 55-59] 
 
The Court of Appeal also noted that s.177 of the 
Criminal Code creates an offence for trespassing 
at night, which includes loitering or prowling on 
another’s property near a dwelling from 9 pm to 
6 am. In this case, the accused’s vehicle was 
parked with its lights out in the middle of the 
night on the parking lot of a residential dwelling, 
in a district where the owner of the vehicle did 
not reside.  
 
The Crown’s appeal was allowed and the 
conviction was restored.  
 
POLICE MAY DETAIN SHORT 
OF FORMAL ARREST 
R. v. T.D., 2005 NSCA 30 
 
A police officer responded to a 
complaint by two chaperones 
that the accused, a young 
offender, was selling drugs to 
students outside a high school dance. The 
accused, who was known to the officer, was 
located shortly afterwards walking with two 
other persons along a highway. The officer asked 
the accused to approach the police car to speak 
to him about the complaint. The accused falsely 
identified himself and said he did not want to 
speak to the officer. The officer told the 
accused that he was investigating the selling of 
drugs at the school, but the accused swore at 
the officer, refused to talk, and said he was 
leaving. The officer again asked the accused to 
come to the car to answer questions, but the 
accused refused. The officer took hold of the 
accused and led him to the police car. The 
accused resisted, head butted the officer, and 
began to flee. The officer grabbed the accused 
and arrested him for assaulting a police officer.  
 
The accused was charged with, among other 
offences, assaulting a police officer in the lawful 
execution of his duty and assault cause bodily 
harm. At his trial the Youth Court Justice 
acquitted the accused of the assault charges 
because he was being unlawfully detained. 
Although the officer had reasonable grounds to 
arrest the accused he did not and, in the trial 
judge’s view, the officer had no right to detain 
the accused without making an arrest.  
 
The Crown appealed to the Nova Scotia Court of 
Appeal arguing the Youth Court Justice erred in 
concluding the detention was unlawful. Justice 
Fichaud, authoring the unanimous appeal court 
judgment, agreed. In R. v. Mann, 2004 SCC 52, 
the Supreme Court of Canada recognized that 
the police have the common law power to detain 
individuals for investigative purposes provided 
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there are reasonable grounds to suspect the 
individual is connected to a particular crime and 
that the detention is necessary. Even though the 
Youth Court recognized the officer had 
reasonable grounds to arrest—a higher standard 
that that required for investigative detention—
she assumed the police could not detain short of 
a formal arrest, which was in error. The 
acquittals on the assault charges were set aside 
and a new trial was ordered.  
 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org 
 
BAIL BREACH SATISFIED 
WHEN CONDITION IGNORED 
R. v. Custance, 2005 MBCA 23 
 
The accused was released on a 
Thursday on a recognizance of 
bail with conditions that he 
reside with his alcoholics 
anonymous sponsor at a specific 
apartment unit, maintain a curfew, and present 
himself for curfew checks. His preliminary 
hearing was to begin on the Monday following his 
release. However, the accused knew he would be 
unable to take possession of the apartment that 
weekend because his sponsor had not yet 
obtained the keys to the apartment. So the 
accused decided to stay in the parking lot of the 
apartment building for three days until his 
preliminary hearing—rather than turn himself in 
to police or return to the remand centre.  The 
police attended the address listed in the bail and 
found it was a storage room—not a suite—and 
that the caretaker told police the accused was 
not a resident of the building. The police then 
attended the accused’s preliminary hearing date 
and arrested him at the courthouse for 
breaching his recognizance.  
 
In Manitoba Provincial Court the accused was 
convicted of failing to reside at the address 
directed, failing to maintain his curfew, and 
failing to present himself for a curfew check. 
The trial judge found the accused intended to 
breach the recognizance by ignoring the court 
order during the days he stayed in the parking 
lot. The accused appealed to the Manitoba Court 
of Appeal arguing the trial judge rendered an 
unreasonable verdict. In his view, the Crown 
failed to prove the mens rea of the offence.  
 
In order to secure a conviction for breaching a 
recognizance under s.145(3) of the Criminal 
Code, the Crown must prove the following: 
 
• the accused was bound by a recognizance 
(actus reus); 
• the accused committed an act prohibited by 
the recognizance or the accused failed to 
perform an act required to be performed by 
the recognizance (actus reus); and 
• the accused knowingly and voluntarily 
performed or failed to perform the act or 
omission (mens rea). 
 
In this case, Justice Steel of the Manitoba 
Court of Appeal found the Crown had proven 
both elements of the actus reus—that the 
accused was bound by the recognizance and 
failed to comply with the conditions. As for the 
mens rea, the court noted that the Crown does 
not have to prove that the accused intended to 
breach the recognizance but only that the 
accused intended to commit the actus reus. 
Recklessness (seeing the risk and taking the 
chance) meets the mens rea requirement under 
s.145(3), but carelessness or negligence will not.  
 
In upholding the trial judge’s ruling that the 
accused did not act with due diligence and did 
not have a lawful excuse for breaching the 
conditions of the recognizance, Justice Steel 
concluded: 
 
The answer is he should have surrendered 
himself to the authorities. This is not a 
situation of a wrong suite number in the 
apartment building. This is a situation of no 
residence at all. The accused knew full well he 
was in trouble. His attempt to comply by 
remaining in the parking lot arose out of an 
understandable desire to avoid returning to 
the Remand Centre. Although technically still a 
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breach of recognizance, the trial judge 
acknowledged the unique factual circumstances 
by way of a sentence of time served. While 
this court also has some sympathy for the 
position the accused found himself on that 
weekend, the interests of the justice system 
are not best served by allowing individuals to 
decide for themselves the legal parameters of 
compliance with the conditions of a 
recognizance. [para. 31] 
 
The appeal was dismissed.  
 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org 
 
BLOOD TAKEN FOR MEDICAL 
PURPOSE NOT CONSCRIPTIVE 
EVIDENCE 
R. v. Stinn, 2005 BCCA 41 
 
Following a motor vehicle 
accident the accused was 
transported by ambulance to 
hospital. A police officer 
informed the accused he was 
being investigated for impaired driving, but the 
accused did not want to speak with a lawyer. A 
blood demand was read but the accused refused 
to consent. A laboratory assistant at the 
hospital arrived to take blood samples from the 
accused for medical purposes. Later the 
investigator learned from another officer that 
an unidentified hospital staff member disclosed 
that the hospital sample had been tested for 
alcohol content and the reading was well in 
excess of the legal limit. The officer attended 
the hospital to obtain the vial number of the 
blood sample and a search warrant was obtained 
to seize the hospital sample and the records 
related to the tests performed on the blood. 
Although the sample had been destroyed when 
the warrant was served, the officer seized 
records related to the tests. 
 
At trial the judge was very critical of the 
officer who learned of the hospital record 
reading and found the disclosure of the 
information about the blood alcohol reading to 
police by hospital staff was a serious s.8 Charter 
breach, but admitted the hospital records under 
s.24(2). In his view, the investigating officer 
would have obtained a warrant even without the 
tainted information provided by his colleague. An 
expert testified and, based on the hospital 
records, was able to provide an opinion that the 
accused’s blood alcohol reading was between 
180mg% and 200mg% at the time of the 
accident. The accused was convicted of impaired 
driving causing bodily harm and dangerous 
driving.  
 
The accused appealed to the British Columbia 
Court of Appeal arguing the blood alcohol 
evidence derived from the hospital records 
should have been excluded because of the s.8 
breach. In his view, his rights were also 
breached when the police obtained a vial number 
for the samples taken at the hospital to include 
in the search warrant application. 
 
The accused’s appeal was dismissed. Blood taken 
for medical purposes is not conscriptive 
evidence, unlike blood taken at the request of 
the police for police purposes, which would be 
conscriptive. The officer also took the proper 
steps in obtaining the hospital blood sample and 
records—a search warrant. The interaction 
between the police officer and the unidentified 
hospital staff was not crucial evidence in this 
case. Even without the communication from the 
hospital employee of the blood alcohol content, 
the officer would have applied for a search 
warrant anyways and the remaining information 
provided a sound basis for a search warrant. 
Justice Hall held: 
 
It is clear that the investigating officer…had, 
entirely aside from any information gleaned by 
[his colleague], decided to seek a search 
warrant so that he could obtain the [accused’s] 
blood sample or the results of a test of the 
sample.  His observations of the [accused] 
around the time of the accident afforded a 
proper basis to obtain such a warrant.  It was 
on the basis of this warrant that the 
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necessary evidence was obtained and expert 
testimony was tendered at trial based on this 
evidence.  I do not see how it can be argued 
that this evidence was somehow "tainted" by 
what had occurred between [the investigator’s 
colleague] and an unidentified employee of the 
hospital.  The situation here is very different 
and distinguishable from what occurred in 
cases…where the evidence relied upon for 
conviction had been obtained as the result of a 
serious Charter breach. [para. 40] 
 
Obtaining the vial number for the samples was 
not a s.8 breach. It was not personal information 
about the accused and it disclosed no 
information about him or his condition. It was 
obtained to precisely delineate what material the 
police were seeking to obtain under the search 
warrant.  
 
The trial judge did not err in admitting the 
evidence. Admitting it would not adversely 
affect the repute of the administration of 
justice. The appeal was dismissed and the 
convictions were upheld. 
 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca 
 
VEHICLE STOP TO SERVE 
PROHIBITION NOT ARBITRARY 
R. v. Sironen, 2005 BCSC 158 
 
A police officer stopped a 
vehicle after querying its 
licence plate. During the rolling 
computer check it was learned 
that the registered owner should be served with 
a notice of driving prohibition from the 
Superintendent of Motor Vehicles.  The sole 
purpose of the stop was to determine whether 
the driver was the person who should be served 
the prohibition. The accused, who was the owner, 
met the officer outside his vehicle and was 
confrontational. The officer told him he would 
be served with a four month driving prohibition. 
While the officer wrote up the prohibition the 
accused entered his vehicle. The accused was 
asked to exit his vehicle for service of the 
prohibition, but refused. After being told he was 
prohibited, the accused said he was not and 
stated he was going to move his vehicle.  
 
The officer told the accused he would be 
arrested if he moved the vehicle. The accused 
then locked his door. After further unsuccessful 
requests to exit the vehicle and threat of arrest 
for obstruction, the officer smashed the vehicle 
window, unlocked the door, and arrested the 
accused for obstruction. The accused was 
transported to the police station and a 
prohibition notice was served. The following day 
the accused was stopped driving by another 
police officer and charged with driving while 
prohibited. In British Columbia Provincial Court 
he was convicted of driving while prohibited, but 
appealed to the Supreme Court of British 
Columbia arguing, in part, that his s.9 Charter 
right protecting him against arbitrary detention 
was violated. 
 
Justice Slade disagreed. Even though s.73 of 
British Columbia’s Motor Vehicle Act allows a 
peace officer to randomly stop a motorist—such 
stop being arbitrary under s.9 of the Charter 
but demonstrably justified under s.1—in this 
case the stop was not random. Justice Slade 
stated: 
 
The [accused] was not, in the present case, 
stopped at random.  The vehicle was stopped 
as the license number search revealed it to be 
owned by a person who the Superintendent of 
Motor Vehicles, acting under the authority of 
s. 93 of the Motor Vehicle Act, had decided to 
prohibit from driving a motor vehicle.  The 
police officer stopped the vehicle to 
determine whether the driver was the 
registered owner.  If he was, the officer 
intended to serve a notice of driving 
prohibition. [para. 14] 
 
And further: 
 
The police stop of the [accused’s] vehicle for 
the purpose of determining his identity, and 
effecting service of a notice of driving 
prohibition was not an arbitrary detention for 
the purposes of s. 9 of the Charter. [para. 39] 
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Furthermore, service of a driving prohibition is 
within a peace officer’s duties and 
responsibilities. As Justice Slade noted, 
“Although s.96 [of the Motor Vehicle Act] does 
not expressly confer on peace officers the 
authority to serve notice of prohibition, it 
clearly contemplates the existence of such 
authority.” As well, the continued detention while 
the officer prepared the notice—lasting only a 
few minutes—was also within the scope of the 
officer’s duties.  
 
The arrest was also lawful. Justice Slade held: 
 
The officer believed, and had reasonable 
grounds to believe, that the [accused] would, in 
the immediate future, commit the offence of 
driving while prohibited. 
……… 
The police officer acted within his authority in 
demanding that the [accused] get out of his 
vehicle.  The [accused] refused to do so. 
 
It is an offence under s. 129 of the Criminal 
Code to resist or wilfully obstruct a peace 
officer in the execution of his duty.  It is plain 
that [the officer] had the authority, and in 
the circumstances the duty, to effect an 
arrest.  The [accused] resisted arrest, and was 
detained and taken into custody for 
obstruction.  There was no breach of the 
[accused’s] s. 9 Charter rights. [para. 43-46] 
 
The accused’s appeal was dismissed.  
 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca 
 
SHOWING BAC DIFFERENT 
NOT ENOUGH TO REBUT 
PRESUMPTION 
R. v. Cook,  
(2005) Docket:C40362 (OntCA) 
 
The accused was charged with 
impaired driving and over 
80mg% after he failed a 
roadside screening test and 
provided breathalyzer tests of 229mg% and 
235mg%. At his trial in the Ontario Court of 
Justice, the accused testified he had consumed 
a 26 oz. bottle of rum the day before his arrest 
and filed a toxicologist report, using elimination 
rates, suggesting his blood alcohol concentration 
would have been between 0 and 95mg% at the 
time of driving.   
 
The trial judge rejected the accused’s “evidence 
to the contrary” and convicted the accused of 
over 80mg%. The charge of impaired driving was 
dismissed. The accused then appealed to the 
Ontario Superior Court of Justice arguing, in 
part, that the trial judge erred in failing to 
consider his evidence to the contrary, but the 
appeal was dismissed. 
 
The accused then appealed to the Ontario Court 
of Appeal. Section 258(1)(d.1) of the Criminal 
Code creates a presumption that breathalyser 
results taken within two hours of driving were 
the same readings at the time of driving. In 
other words, the level of blood alcohol content 
at the time of driving and the time of tests are 
identical. This presumption is known as the 
presumption of identity and is rebuttable if 
there is evidence tending to show the blood 
alcohol level did not exceed 80mg%.  
 
In rebutting s.258(1)(d.1) it is not sufficient to 
lead evidence that the blood alcohol level at the 
time of the test was different than the time of 
driving. Rather, the accused must lead evidence 
tending to show that the concentration at the 
time of the offence did not exceed 80mg%. So, 
as in this case, leading evidence that the accused 
blood alcohol level straddled both sides of 
80mg% was not enough. The appeal was 
dismissed. 
 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca 
 
Note-able Quote 
 
Let us not become weary in doing good—
Galations 6:9 
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REASONABLE GROUNDS MUST 
BE SUPPORTED OBJECTIVELY 
R. v. Perello, 2005 SKCA 8 
 
The accused was given a warning 
ticket after he was stopped 
driving his camper van on the 
Trans Canada Highway because 
he was traveling 107 km/h in a 100 km/h zone. 
The accused consented to a search of his van 
following a discussion about contraband. The 
officer did a thorough search, opening cupboards 
and drawers. A second officer arrived to join in 
the search and found money wrapped in bundles 
in a duffle bag. The accused told police the bag 
contained $55,000. 
 
The accused was arrested for a proceeds of 
crime investigation and the money and van were 
seized and taken to the detachment. The van was 
more thoroughly searched and it was discovered 
that the sewage tank had been modified, there 
was an odour of marihuana detected coming from 
the shower drain, and small quantity of psilocybin 
was identified. The accused was charged with 
possessing the psilocybin and released.  
 
After further investigation a search warrant 
was obtained for the accused’s British Columbia 
residence where a tiny amount of marihuana was 
found. The accused was charged with possession 
of proceeds of crime ($55,000) and possession 
of money with intent to conceal or convert. 
 
At trial the accused submitted that all the 
evidence was inadmissible. The trial judge, 
however, disagreed and convicted the accused of 
all charges. In her view, the amount of cash 
found, its manner of transportation and 
packaging, and the accused’s physical reaction to 
its discovery provided sufficient grounds to 
make an arrest for possession of proceeds of 
crime. The accused then appealed to the 
Saskatchewan Court of Appeal arguing, in part, 
that he was arbitrarily detained contrary to s.9 
and that the seizure of the money was 
unreasonable under s.8 of the Charter.  
A lawful arrest requires reasonable grounds. 
Reasonable grounds must be both subjectively 
held by the officer and objectively justified. In 
this case, the police had the following 
circumstances: 
 
• the accused was travelling in a van bearing 
Ontario plates west on the TransCanada 
Highway in Saskatchewan;  
• he consented to a search of his van; 
• the officer was aware the accused did not 
have a criminal record; 
• the accused was cooperative and helped police 
in their search, but became extremely upset 
when the money was found; and 
• only $55,000 had been found prior to the 
arrest. 
 
Justice Sherstobitoff, writing the unanimous 
Saskatchewan Court of Appeal judgment, found 
“the discovery of $55,000.00 cash in a vehicle 
registered in another province and being driven 
on the TransCanada highway,” with nothing more, 
insufficient to meet the objective component of 
reasonable grounds. At the time of arrest there 
was no direct evidence that the money was 
proceeds of any crime; therefore there were no 
reasonable grounds to believe an offence 
occurred that would justify an arrest. The 
arresting officer did not tell the accused he had 
committed an offence, but rather said he was 
“under arrest for proceeds of crime 
investigation.” Justice Sherstobitoff wrote: 
 
In this case, there was no evidence, at the 
time of arrest, that the [accused] had 
committed any crime of which the funds were 
the proceeds or that he knew that the funds 
were the proceeds of a crime, nor any evidence 
from which it could reasonably be so inferred. 
That being so, objectively, there were no 
reasonable and probable grounds to support 
the arrest. The arrest was not lawful. 
……… 
In this case, we have found that there were no 
reasonable and probable grounds to believe 
that the offence of possession of the 
proceeds of crime had occurred so as allow 
arrest without a warrant. Furthermore, the 
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evidence indicates that at least some of the 
police involved in the arrest were, at the very 
least, doubtful that reasonable and probable 
grounds to believe that the offence had 
occurred. They nevertheless arrested the 
[accused]. The arrest was arbitrary within the 
meaning of s. 9. [paras. 39-41] 
 
Since there were no reasonable grounds to 
justify the arrest, similarly there were no 
reasonable grounds to justify the seizure of the 
money. The appeal court held: 
 
It logically follows that, notwithstanding the 
consent to the search, if the arrest was 
unlawful, the seizure of the $55,000.00 was 
unlawful and in violation of the [accused’s] 
right granted by s. 8 of the Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms to be secure against 
unreasonable seizure. We have determined 
that the police did not have reasonable and 
probable grounds to believe that the [accused] 
had committed the offence of possession of 
the proceeds of crime. The same reasoning 
establishes that there were no reasonable and 
probable grounds to believe that the monies 
were the proceeds of crime. The police cannot 
rely on an unlawful arrest, whether arbitrary 
or not, to gain the requisite grounds to seize 
the money. The situation here is…that…the 
police had no reasonable or probable grounds 
to believe at the time of seizure of the money 
that it was the proceeds of crime. [para. 42] 
 
The evidence was excluded under s.24(2) and the 
convictions were quashed and acquittals entered. 
 
Complete case available at www.lawsociety.sk.ca 
 
ARREST LAWFUL DESPITE 
OFFICER USING THE WORD 
‘DETAIN’ 
R. v. Dickinson, 2005 BCPC 41 
 
A police officer received 
information from a reliable 
informant that the accused, who 
was an active dealer and always 
had drugs on him, was trafficking in 
methamphetamine in $40 to $80 amounts. The 
officer was also given the accused’s cell phone 
number. A couple of days later the officer called 
the cell phone number and asked to purchase an 
eighty of methamphetamine. The accused, who 
the officer knew and voice he recognized, told 
the officer he did not have any, but to call him 
later to make a meet. The officer also talked to 
members of the drug task force and was told the 
accused was a target of theirs and was involved 
in trafficking drugs. 
 
The officer subsequently stopped the accused 
after he was seen skateboarding and talking on 
his cell phone. The accused was told he was 
under detention and would have to return to the 
detachment to be searched. He was handcuffed 
and his backpack was taken from him. A search 
of his backpack netted three baggies of 
methamphetamine, a scale, and other items. The 
accused was charged with possession of 
methamphetamine for the purpose of 
trafficking. 
 
During a voir dire in British Columbia Provincial 
Court, Justice Sinclair was tasked with 
determining whether the accused had been 
lawfully arrested and whether the search of his 
backpack that followed was also lawful. In 
holding the arrest proper, Justice Sinclair 
stated: 
 
Firstly, I conclude briefly that there is no 
doubt in my mind that the accused was placed 
under arrest on the street notwithstanding 
the word used. He was under arrest and I 
attach little or no significance to the word 
used. I conclude that it was clear to both the 
constable and to him that he was under arrest; 
he was handcuffed, he was placed in the police 
car, not given any choice whether he was going 
to accompany the officer. 
 
Reasonable and probable grounds to make an 
arrest of a subject must be justifiable both on 
a subjective and an objective basis. Certainly I 
am satisfied that the police officer had 
subjective grounds to arrest the accused. I am 
also satisfied, given the information known to 
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the validity of proceedings in an
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him, that the arrest passes the objective 
standard; that is, briefly, a reasonable man in 
the position of the police officer and, knowing 
what he knew, would believe that the accused 
was probably guilty of the offence charged. 
[paras. 7-8] 
 
Since there were reasonable grounds to justify 
the arrest, the resultant search was lawful as an 
incident to arrest.  
 
Furthermore, even if the search breached s.8 of 
the Charter, the evidence should not be 
excluded under s.24(2). It was non-conscriptive, 
its admission would not render the trial unfair, 
and the breach was not serious. The evidence 
was admissible. 
 
Complete case available at www.provincialcourt.bc.ca 
 
 
WHAT DOES ‘MORE THAN ONE 
MURDER COMMITTED AT 
DIFFERENT TIMES’ MEAN? 
R. v. Samra & Maljkovich,  
(2005) Docket: C40709/C40710 (OntCA) 
 
The accused Samra was 
convicted of two counts of first 
degree murder and one count of 
attempted murder for a 
shooting incident in court where a lawyer and a 
lawyer’s associate were killed. Samra had pulled 
a gun and started shooting after the presiding 
judge read out an unfavourable decision.  
 
The accused Maljkovich was convicted of two 
counts of second degree murder and one count 
of attempted murder after he killed his wife, 
left the room, locked the door, and killed his 
daughter in the hallway. The accused then tried 
to kill his daughter’s boyfriend after the 
boyfriend tried to aid. 
 
On an ex parte 
application by Crown, 
Justice Marshall of the 
Ontario Court of Justice 
granted an application that DNA substances be 
taken under s.487.055 of the Criminal Code for 
the DNA databank since both men had been 
“convicted of more than one murder committed 
at different times.”  
 
The accused applied for certiorari and Justice 
McCombs of the Ontario Superior Court of 
Justice quashed the authorizations and ordered 
the DNA profiles be removed from the DNA 
databank and destroyed. In his view, the 
legislation did not extend to multiple murders 
committed as part of the same transaction. If it 
were otherwise, Justice McCombs reasoned, 
parliament would not have used the phrase 
“committed at different times.” The Crown 
appealed the order of Justice McCombs to the 
Ontario Court of Appeal 
arguing he incorrectly 
interpreted the meaning 
of the phrase “more than 
one murder committed at 
different times.”  
 
The Ontario Court of Appeal rejected Justice 
McCombs transaction theory, but affirmed his 
order in any event. In interpreting the phrase 
“more than one murder committed at different 
times,” a court must read the words in their 
entire context, in their grammatical and ordinary 
sense with the scheme of the Act, the object of 
the Act, and the intention of Parliament. In 
doing so, Justice Weiler, authoring the 
unanimous appeal judgment, dismissed both of 
Crown’s appeals, stating: 
 
The phrase “more than one murder committed 
at different times” has a twofold meaning.  
First, time is divisible by time periods such as 
days, weeks, months, years.  Second, time is 
also divisible by events that differ in nature or 
quality.  An example of the first meaning 
occurs when a contract killer agrees to kill two 
people and kills one person in January and the 
other in February. This meaning is not in issue.  
An example of the second occurs when two 
persons are taken hostage by a terrorist in an 
office in downtown Toronto.  One person 
attempts to escape and is shot dead by the 
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terrorist.  Ten minutes later the police rush 
the office and, as they do so, the second 
hostage tries to overpower the terrorist and is 
shot dead by him.  The murders are committed 
at different times because they are 
distinguishable in nature or quality and did not 
occur simultaneously. 
 
I must now apply this definition to the cases 
before us.  The murders committed by Samra 
were not committed at “different times” 
because they were committed immediately 
after the court’s decision was read out in 
court and are not distinguishable in nature or 
quality.  I would therefore dismiss the Crown’s 
appeal in relation to Samra. 
 
Given the proximity in time of Maljkovich’s two 
murders, he may also not have committed more 
than one murder at different times. Because 
Maljkovich exited the bedroom and closed and 
locked the door to it, arguably, however, the 
murders were committed at different points.  
I will therefore examine the nature and quality 
of those murders.  In the transcript of the 
guilty plea and sentencing proceedings, 
[Justice Then] commented on defence 
counsel’s submissions that Maljkovich saw his 
marriage deteriorating and had to face the 
fact that he was going to lose much of what he 
had worked to achieve.  He also lost his ability 
to work for himself.  He could no longer 
provide for his family and was losing his place 
within the family structure.  His children were 
becoming increasingly independent.  He was 
losing his marriage, his wife, his children, and 
his financial security. [Justice Then] found 
that the evidence suggested Maljkovich 
became alienated from his family. He further 
found Maljkovich suffered from various 
unresolved mental health problems.  As 
[Justice Then] stated, “The reason for this 
tragedy will also, no doubt, lie somewhere in 
the darkness of the depression and personality 
difficulties which the accused has experienced 
and will continue to experience into the 
future”.  On this record, the murders of 
Maljkovich’s wife and daughter are not 
distinguishable in nature or quality.   
Accordingly, I would also dismiss the Crown’s 
appeal in relation to Maljkovich. [paras. 22-24] 
  
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca 
‘SHARING’ MARIHUANA 
AMOUNTS TO TRAFFICKING 
R. v. Smith, 2005 BCPC 27 
 
Acting on a complaint from a 
university’s security services 
that there was open marihuana 
use and possible trafficking 
near a fountain on campus, plain clothed police 
officers surveilled the accused. He was neither a 
student nor employee of the university, but 
rather the president of Hempology 101. He drove 
to the campus and set up a signboard, literature, 
and a sound system. At 4:20 pm the accused 
yelled, “It’s 4:20 everybody,” and a group of 30 
to 50 people began to congregate. He then 
addressed the crowd about the laws regarding 
marihuana and its medical benefits. The accused 
then removed about five cigarettes and passed 
them around. When the cigarette reached the 
undercover officer it was pocketed. After the 
meeting disbanded, he was arrested. His 
briefcase and a green bag he possessed were 
searched and police found a total of 7.8 grams of 
marihuana. He was charged with trafficking in 
marihuana and possession for the purpose of 
trafficking.  
 
At his trial in British Columbia Provincial Court, 
the accused argued several of his rights under 
the Charter were violated including s.9 (freedom 
from arbitrary detention or imprisonment). In 
his view, he was singled out by the police and 
targeted. Justice  Kay, however, disagreed. She 
stated: 
 
An arbitrary detention occurs when there in an 
entire absence of reasonable and probable 
grounds for arrest. That is not the case here. 
The officers were at the gathering to 
investigate a complaint, they smelled the 
marihuana, saw hand rolled cigarettes in a box 
in [the accused’s] briefcase, and were present 
when these cigarettes were lit and passed 
around. I find that these observations in 
conjunction with the other information they 
had been given, gave them reasonable grounds, 
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both objective and subjective, to believe that 
a law was being broken. Upon arrest, further 
marihuana was found in [the accused’s] 
possession. Therefore, I find that this was not 
a "capricious, despotic, or unjustifiable" arrest 
which would violate Charter rights and I find 
that [the accused’s] s. 9 rights were not 
violated. [para. 33] 
 
The accused also argued that his rights under 
s.2 of the Charter, guaranteeing him the 
freedoms of peaceful assembly and association 
were breached because he was released on an 
undertaking by police after his arrest that 
prohibited him from going to the university 
campus. It was his submission that this condition 
was an unreasonable restriction. This argument 
was rejected: 
 
The Criminal Code of Canada sets out the 
procedure for both the police and for the 
courts to follow after an individual has been 
arrested. An accused may be released from 
custody by either a peace officer or the court 
pursuant to several sections including ss. 503 
and 515 of the Code. These sections clearly 
authorize either a police officer or the court 
to attach conditions to an accused’s release. 
 
There are also sections of the Code which 
allow an accused to apply to the court to vary 
the terms of an undertaking on which he has 
been released. There is no evidence that [the 
accused] has ever applied to vary the condition 
that he not go to the University of Victoria. As 
a result, I find that [the accused’s] ss. 2 (c) 
and (d) have not been violated. [paras. 24-25] 
 
In convicting the accused of trafficking in 
marihuana, Justice Kay held: 
 
[The accused] has been charged with 
trafficking marihuana. Trafficking is defined 
in s. 2 of the Controlled Drugs and Substances 
Act as "to sell, administer, give, transfer, 
transport, send or deliver the substance. 
Within the plain meaning of the word, I find 
that [the accused] was giving or transferring 
the substance to others in the gathering. [The 
accused] would have the court characterize his 
activities as "sharing a joint" with others, and 
submits that the laying of a charge of 
trafficking for this activity is disproportionate 
to the behaviour and conviction in the 
circumstances of this case would bring the 
administration of justice into disrepute. [The 
accused] equates his behaviour with that of 
two persons sitting in a car or on a bench 
quietly "sharing" a joint. There is compelling 
evidence that such an analogy is not accurate. 
[The accused] was "sharing" marihuana in a 
very public way, routinely, with a large 
gathering. He was very publicly flouting the 
law, and while one can only speculate about the 
reasons for this, I find that his behaviour was 
intended to provoke a reaction from the 
authorities. [para 42] 
 
The charge of possession 
of marihuana for the 
purpose of trafficking 
was stayed because of 
the Kienapple principle.  
 
Complete case available at www.provincialcourt.bc.ca 
 
WAITING A SECOND OR TWO 
BEFORE ENTRY INSUFFICIENT 
R. v. Mai & Tang, 2005 BCSC 29 
 
After investigating a marihuana 
grow operation at a residence in 
an officer’s neighbourhood, the 
police attended the premise with 
a search warrant. They knocked 
on the door, shouted “Police. Open the door,” and 
“Search warrant. Open up.”  After waiting only a 
second or two, they breached the door with a 
battering ram. Both accused—husband and 
wife—were found inside the house along with a 
marihuana grow operation located in the 
basement. They were arrested and subsequently 
charged with unlawful production of marihuana, 
possession of marihuana for the purpose of 
trafficking, and theft of electricity.   
 
At their trial in the Supreme Court of British 
Columbia the accused argued, in part, that their 
rights under s.8 of the Charter had been 
violated because the search had been carried 
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out in an unreasonable manner. In their view the 
police failed to comply with the knock, and 
announce rule. 
 
Justice Joyce agreed. Although the police did 
knock and announce their presence, they did not 
give the occupants a reasonable opportunity to 
respond before they rammed the door. He 
stated: 
 
The knock and announce rule may be required 
in order to give the occupants a reasonable 
time to respond to the demand for entry 
pursuant to the warrant…  It may be only to 
permit the occupants to prepare to be safely 
detained or arrested and to put down toy guns, 
channel changers or other objects that have 
the potential to mistakenly life-threatening 
danger to the entering police officers.  What 
is a reasonable delay between the 
announcement and the breach may be 
different depending on which of these 
purposes is to be met. 
 
It is not necessary for me to determine, in 
this case, which of those purposes govern.  In 
either case, a second or two is an insufficient 
time.  A second or two is insufficient warning 
for an occupant to realize what is happening 
and to understand and appreciate the police 
are at the door and intending to enter.  It 
gives insufficient time to prepare oneself and 
certainly insufficient time to comply with the 
demand to open up.  I am satisfied that 
unnecessary and unreasonable force was used 
by the police in entering the premises in 
breach of the accused's right to be free from 
unreasonable search. [paras. 55-56, 
references omitted] 
 
In finding the entry into the residence a s.8 
Charter breach, the evidence was excluded 
under s.24(2). Justice Joyce held: 
 
In this case, [the officer in control] knew he 
should wait a reasonable time to permit the 
occupants to respond.  He did not do so.  There 
was no change of circumstance that 
heightened any risk upon which an assertion of 
good faith can be founded.  It is clear that 
[the officer] had a personal interest in this 
matter in the sense that he was 
understandably concerned about a possible 
marihuana grow operation in his own backyard, 
so to speak.  In my view, he let his zeal and his 
desire to do something about the situation 
overcome what he knew was his duty.  While I 
do not conclude he acted with the expressed 
intention of violating the accused's rights, I 
do not think it can be said that he acted in the 
belief that he was observing it.  In my view, 
the reputation of the administration of justice 
would suffer if this evidence were admitted.  
The evidence is excluded. [para. 61] 
 
The accused were acquitted of all charges. 
 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca 
 
INVALID ARREST RESULTS IN 
UNREASONABLE SEARCH 
R. v. Luc, 2004 SKCA 11719 
 
Police in Saskatchewan stopped 
a British Columbia plated rental 
vehicle for speeding on the 
TransCanada Highway. The 
driver produced a photo driver’s licence while 
the accused passenger produced a photo Canada 
Immigration identification card. After querying 
the occupants’ names on CPIC, an officer 
received information that the driver was wanted 
on an outstanding Canada immigration warrant. 
After returning to the vehicle and asking for 
more identification, the driver looked down at 
the floor. He was asked to come back to the 
police car and was arrested on the outstanding 
warrant.  
 
Police searched the vehicle incidental to the 
driver’s arrest for more identification. They 
searched the glove box, console, and front seat 
area. On the front seat police found a wallet 
with identification, but no photos. The police 
then immediately went to the rear hatch area of 
the vehicle—skipping the back seat—and found 
marihuana in a Rubbermaid container. The driver 
and the accused passenger—who was the renter 
of the vehicle—were then arrested for 
                                                 
19 Leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada was dismissed without reasons 
April 14, 2005. 
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possession of marihuana for the purpose of 
trafficking. The car was then towed to the 
detachment and searched further. In the 
container police found seven one pound packages 
of marihuana. Twenty four more pounds of 
marihuana was found in two cardboard boxes and 
a suitcase.  
 
The next day the driver was fingerprinted to 
confirm he was the one wanted by Immigration, 
but the officer realized the driver was not the 
person wanted in the warrant. The driver’s name 
was “Huang, Shi Lin” while the person wanted on 
the warrant was “Lin, Huo Shil”. They had 
different dates of birth but both were born in 
the same year.  
 
At trial, the judge found the arresting officer 
had reasonable grounds to arrest the driver on 
the outstanding warrant under s.495(1)(c) of the 
Criminal Code and the honest mistake made did 
not detract from those grounds. He then 
concluded the search was incidental to the 
arrest and the marihuana was admissible. 
Moreover, even if he had found a Charter 
violation, the trial judge would have admitted the 
evidence under s.24(2) in any event. The accused 
appealed to the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal 
arguing, in part, that the trial judge erred in 
finding the accused’s s.8 and s.9 Charter rights 
had not been violated.  
 
Chief Justice Bayda, for the unanimous court, 
ruled the accused, as a passenger, did not have 
his s.9 right violated when the police initially 
stopped the car. He stated: 
 
Section 40(8) of The Highway Traffic 
Act…coupled with the decision of the Supreme 
Court of Canada in R. v. Ladouceur…and this 
Court's decision in R. v. Tremblay… 
authorized  the two police officers to stop the 
Toyota and detain the occupants (including the 
passenger) for the time necessary to carry out 
the officers' responsibilities under The 
Highway Traffic Act. Excessive behaviour 
aside, where officers are so authorized, the 
stop and the concomitant exercise by them of 
those responsibilities do not constitute a 
violation of the s. 9 Charter rights of the 
vehicle's occupants. 
 
The [accused’s] counsel made submissions to us 
to the effect that in light of the failure by 
the officers to use the radar device or a 
"clock" procedure to establish the true speed, 
it is reasonable to infer the supposed speeding 
infraction was the ostensible reason for the 
stop. The real reason was to check the vehicle 
for possible contraband. This sort of ulterior 
motive is difficult to prove at the best of 
times and it was not established in this case. 
As [Supreme Court of Canada Justice Sopinka] 
in his concurring judgment in R. v. 
Belnavis…pointed out: "an automobile... 
pursuant to decisions of this Court, can be 
lawfully stopped by police officers virtually at 
random."  [paras. 22-23] 
 
However, a search incidental to arrest will be 
valid only if the arrest is lawful, the search is 
conducted as an incident to the arrest, and the 
search is carried out in a reasonable manner. In 
this case, the trial judge found the arrest lawful 
under s.495(1)(c) of the Criminal Code, which 
permits a police officer to arrest without 
warrant if they have reasonable grounds to 
believe that a warrant of arrest or committal in 
any form set out in Part XXVIII is in force.  
Here, the warrant was issued under s.103(1) of 
the Immigration Act, which did not fall within 
“any form set out in Part XXVIII” of the 
Criminal Code. The arrest was therefore unlawful 
and any power to search incidental to that arrest 
was invalid. 
 
Furthermore, the search failed to meet the 
second condition of a valid search incident to 
arrest—for safety reasons or to find evidence. 
Although the officer testified he wanted to find 
further evidence to support the identity of the 
driver, there were serious doubts that this was 
the real reason for his search of the 
Rubbermaid container. Chief Justice Bayda 
stated: 
 
In the circumstances of the present case once 
the police ensured their own safety - and no 
question was raised about their safety - what 
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could properly justify the search of the 
Rubbermaid tub in the back of the 
vehicle?  [The officer] stated his purpose was 
to find "further evidence to support the 
identity of the driver."  Does this purpose 
meet the requisite reasonable subjective and 
objective criteria? In assessing 
reasonableness, these questions come to mind: 
Was there a need to secure further evidence 
of identity?  What evidence of identity did the 
searcher already have?  Was there a more 
effective way of establishing identity than the 
kind of search that was undertaken?  
 
Before he commenced the search, [the 
officer] had already concluded that the names 
Huo Shil Lin appearing on the warrant and 
Huang, Shi Lin appearing on the driver's 
licence were essentially the same and that 
they referred to the same person. He 
concluded that the driver was that person. If 
that were not the case, then there was no 
justification for the arrest. The driver was 
not arrested for having committed an offence 
so there was no question of securing evidence 
of any offence. 
 
Before he searched the Rubbermaid tub, [the 
officer] had five items of identification in his 
hand…identifying the driver as Huang, Shi Lin, 
the same person as he earlier concluded Huo 
Shil Lin to be. How could his purpose have been 
advanced with a sixth piece of identification in 
the name of Huang, Shi Lin?  Why did his 
search take him from the front seat of the 
vehicle where he found the additional four 
items of identification directly to the back of 
the vehicle (skipping the back seat) and, what 
is equally puzzling, not to the suitcase, not to 
the clothing where he was more likely to find 
some item of identification, but to the 
Rubbermaid tub, the last place where one 
would expect to find an item of 
identification?  Why did he abandon the sole 
purpose of his search, namely a search for 
further evidence of identity, the moment he 
discovered some marihuana? 
 
There was a suggestion by [the officer] that 
the driver was using an alias. As noted, he 
testified "I believed the driver of the vehicle 
was not exactly who he said he was."  Did he 
mean by this that "Huang, Shi Lin" was an 
alias?  Did he mean that "Huo Shil Lin" was an 
alias, as well? (After all, he concluded they 
were essentially the same name.) And, that the 
arrest warrant was issued not in the immigrant 
driver's true name, but an alias?  Or did he 
mean that "Huang, Shi Lin" was the alias, but 
"Huo Shil Lin" was the true name? Or did he 
mean that the two names could possibly be 
referring to two different persons?  Why 
would someone travelling, using an alias, carry 
in his belongings some document that 
established his true identity?  
 
All of those unanswered questions leave one 
with a feeling of unease. They cast a serious 
doubt on the purpose of the search asserted 
by [the officer]- in other words, a doubt on 
the reasonableness of the subjective element 
of the test.  
 
If identity were truly an issue, a reasonable 
person looking at the matter objectively would 
have asked: What is the most effective way to 
match up the driver's identity with that of the 
person named in the warrant?  The answer 
would have been precisely the answer that [the 
officer] came to the following day:  match the 
fingerprints. No search of the Rubbermaid tub 
was required or reasonable in light of that 
answer. As a 13-year veteran of the R.C.M.P., 
[the officer] was likely aware of that answer 
before he undertook the search of the 
Rubbermaid tub. [paras. 45-50] 
 
However, despite the Charter violations in this 
case, the evidence was admitted because to 
exclude it would bring greater disrepute for the 
administration of justice. The accused’s appeal 
was dismissed.  
 
Complete case available at www.lawsociety.sk.ca 
 
Note-able Quote 
 
on Media Influence—We’re careful to teach our 
kids not to talk to strangers or wander the 
streets by themselves. Most of us make sure we 
know where are children are physically and with 
whom. And yet, day after day, year after year, 
we let them wander alone, virtually unsupervised, 
through this other universe—almost completely 
oblivious to what they’re seeing, hearing, playing 
with, and learning—James P. Steyer 
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RECORDED STATEMENT NOT 
PRESUMPTIVELY NECESSARY 
FOR VOLUNTARINESS 
R. v. Swanek, 
(2005) Docket:C39541 (OntCA) 
 
After arresting the accused who 
was already in custody at a jail 
facility, two officers questioned 
him regarding two robberies. At 
trial the officers testified the accused admitted 
his involvement in the robberies, but declined to 
sign the officers’ notebooks where the questions 
and answers had been recorded or to sign 
photographs of his accomplices he identified.  As 
well, the officers said they offered the accused 
an opportunity to put his statement on audiotape 
but he declined. The accused, on the other hand, 
testified he did not make the inculpatory 
statements when asked about the robberies and 
was not asked to sign the photographs. Despite 
these contradictions the accused was convicted 
in the Ontario Superior Court of Justice.  
 
The accused unsuccessfully appealed to the 
Ontario Court of Appeal arguing, in part, that his 
convictions based on the non-recorded 
statements were presumptively unreasonable. 
Although courts have emphasized the importance 
of an appropriate recording by police and the 
failure to properly record a statement will weigh 
heavily against the Crown when the voluntariness 
of a statement is at issue, there is no such per 
se rule. Rather, “the extent to which the failure 
to create an independent record of a statement 
undermines the credibility of the police version 
as it relates to voluntariness or the content of 
the statement will depend on the circumstances 
of the case.” As Justice Doherty stated: 
 
It cannot be gainsaid that a proper recording of 
a statement is most beneficial in assessing both 
its voluntariness and the content of the 
statement. It is, however, a long step from that 
observation to the conclusion that any 
statement that is not properly recorded should 
be excluded if it is the only evidence relied on 
by the Crown. [para. 10] 
 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca 
 
POLICY BASED STOP 
ARBITRARY 
R. v. Schaeffer, 2005 SKCA 33 
 
A police officer stopped the 
accused driving in a regional 
park just before midnight. The 
only reason he was stopped was 
because the police had a policy 
to stop all vehicle and pedestrian traffic in the 
park after 11 pm. The police had been requested 
by the Regional Park Association to check 
vehicles because of previous thefts and parties 
involving young persons. As well, park passes 
were required for persons in the park after 11 
pm. The accused was flushed, had watery eyes, 
and smelled of liquor. He failed a roadside 
screening device and subsequently provided 
breath samples over 80 mg% and was charged 
accordingly. 
 
At his trial in Saskatchewan Provincial Court the 
judge concluded the accused had been 
arbitrarily detained under s.9 of the Charter. 
Although s.40(8) of Saskatchewan’s Highway 
Traffic Act allows police to stop motorists for 
purposes related to highway or vehicle safety, 
that was not why the police stopped the accused 
in this case. Rather, the accused was stopped for 
the purposes of enforcing a policy to discourage 
would-be partiers, vandals, thieves, and to check 
park permits. This was a random stop not related 
to violations under the Highway Traffic Act. The 
breathalyzer tests were excluded under s.24(2) 
and the accused was acquitted. The Crown’s 
appeal to the Saskatchewan Court of Queen’s 
Bench was dismissed.  
 
The Crown further appealed to the 
Saskatchewan Court of Appeal arguing that the 
accused was not arbitrarily detained because the 
police had an articulable cause to stop him. In 
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rendering a decision, Justice Richards, authoring 
the unanimous judgment, first noted that the 
legality of a stop and the arbitrariness of a stop 
are conceptually distinct. For example, an illegal 
stop may not necessarily be arbitrary while a 
legal stop may be arbitrary. He stated: 
 
It is admittedly difficult to imagine a situation 
where there are reasonable grounds to detain 
an individual and where, at the same time, the 
detention of that person could be 
characterized as arbitrary. In other words, 
the existence of reasonable grounds to detain 
is inconsistent with the characteristics of 
capriciousness and randomness which mark 
arbitrary action. Nonetheless, it is best not to 
confuse the conceptually separate issues of 
authority and arbitrariness. I prefer to deal 
directly with the arbitrariness of the 
[accused’s] detention rather than to analyze it 
indirectly by way of a concept like articulable 
cause/reasonable grounds to detain. 
 
Maintaining the distinction between legal 
authority and arbitrariness recommends itself 
in this case for an additional reason. The 
concept of reasonable grounds to detain was 
developed in relation to detention for the 
purpose of investigating criminal offences…It 
thus reflects a balance between the need to 
safeguard individual liberties on the one hand 
and the need to ensure that the police can 
protect the community from crime on the other. 
To the extent that the stop in this case was 
driven by an attempt to enforce a policy of the 
Regional Park Authority or a Park Authority 
bylaw which might or might not even create 
offences for noncompliance, there is a question 
of principle as to whether the reasonable 
grounds to detain doctrine would be applicable. 
The extension of police powers to allow for 
investigative detentions in respect of issues 
well beyond the criminal realm is a matter of 
some consequence. I would not want a discussion 
featuring articulable cause or reasonable cause 
for detention to be taken as mapping out the 
limits of police powers when, in fact, the issue 
before the Court in this case is the separate 
matter of whether the [accused’s] detention 
was arbitrary. [paras. 33-34, references 
omitted] 
The Crown contended that because only 
individuals with park passes were supposed to be 
in the park after 11 pm, it was not arbitrary to 
stop persons after that time to check for passes 
and doing so was the only effective way the pass 
requirement could be enforced. This submission 
was rejected, however, because other police 
initiatives which stop all highway traffic to 
check licences and registrations have been held 
to be arbitrary (although saved by the 
justifiability analysis under s.1 of the Charter).  
 
Nor did the officer have an articulable cause or 
reasonable grounds to detain the accused, which 
would have rendered the stop not arbitrary. 
Justice Richards wrote: 
 
In the present case, [the officer] offered no 
reason for stopping the [accused] other than 
that he was driving in the Park after 11 p.m. 
There was nothing about him, his driving, his 
vehicle or the circumstances to distinguish him 
from anyone else in the Park or to suggest, in 
any positive way, that he had committed an 
offence or violated Park policies…No 
explanation distinguishing the respondent from 
other drivers or suggesting that he was 
breaking the law or a Park rule was provided in 
this case. 
 
Section 9 of the Charter must be interpreted 
purposively. Seen from that perspective, it 
must surely engage when a police detention is 
based on nothing more than the bare possibility 
that the individual detained somehow might 
have offended the law in some fashion unknown 
to the officer making the stop. Detentions of 
that sort reflect the capriciousness and 
randomness which are perhaps the most 
revealing characteristics of arbitrary action. 
[paras. 43-44] 
 
The Crown’s appeal was dismissed.  
 
Complete case available at www.lawsociety.sk.ca 
 
Note-able Quote 
 
Doing the same behaviour but expecting a 
different outcome is the definition of insanity—
author unknown 
 26            www.jibc.bc.ca Volume 5 Issue 3 
  May/June 2005 
COPS AS CROWN MAY 
CONTINUE 
R. v. Cooper et al, 2005 BCCA 256 
 
The accused were issued traffic 
tickets and at trial the police 
officer who issued the tickets 
presented the case for the 
Crown while also giving evidence. 
Although it was conceded that the practice of 
the prosecutor and the enforcement officer 
(witness) being the same person violated the 
accused’s right to a fair trial pursuant to s.11(d) 
of the Charter, the procedure was found to be a 
reasonable limitation prescribed by law under s.1 
of the Charter by the British Columbia Supreme 
Court. The accused, however, appealed to the 
British Columbia Court of Appeal arguing the 
judge erred in characterizing the breach as a 
potential conflict of interest creating a risk of 
unfairness rather than an actual conflict of 
interest creating real unfairness.   
 
Under British Columbia’s Offence Act, a 
prosecutor includes an informant, which in turn 
includes an enforcement officer who signs a 
violation ticket. Justice Saunders, authoring the 
unanimous judgment, summarized the importance 
of these definitions as follows: 
 
A prosecutor may be an informant. An 
informant may be the enforcement officer who 
signs a violation ticket. Thus under the Offence 
Act the officer signing the motor vehicle 
violation ticket may be the prosecutor and by 
ss. 64 and 65 may conduct the case, including 
by examining and cross-examining witnesses. As 
the enforcement officer signing the ticket is 
likely the key prosecution witness, it can be said 
that the Offence Act contemplates the 
enforcement officer functioning both as 
witness and as prosecutor. The procedure in 
issue is one "prescribed by law" within the 
meaning of s. 1 of the Charter. [para. 6] 
 
Moreover, she agreed with the trial judge’s 
finding that the police officer filling a dual role 
was saved by s.1 of the Charter. She stated: 
Accepting for the purpose of discussion that 
this statement accurately states the law in 
British Columbia, the question is whether the 
same applies to proceedings such as these, 
which are regulatory or quasi-criminal in nature. 
Notwithstanding Mr. Nathanson's able 
submissions, I am not persuaded that the 
procedures adopted here are unconstitutional. 
The procedure in issue here is, in my view, 
justified within the meaning of s. 1 of the 
Charter, having consideration to the regulatory 
nature of the Motor Vehicle Act and the 
enforcement provision of the Offence Act, the 
nature of the offences charged, the volume of 
like cases to be handled, the geography and 
resources of the province, and significantly, 
both the procedural safeguards established in 
the Offence Act and the independent role of 
the Justice of the Peace. [para. 13] 
 
And further: 
 
I consider that the summary conviction appeal 
judge correctly identified the scheme. It is a 
scheme designed to process, simply and 
efficiently, a large number of violation tickets 
for minor offences, in an inexpensive but 
balanced hearing process. While simplicity, 
efficiency and cost-effectiveness are 
important components to that objective, so too 
is the objective of a fair hearing process. The 
objectives have benefit for the public, who 
must pay for the enforcement process, as well 
as to the disputants who receive a simple and 
cost-effective system by which they may 
contest a ticket.  
 
The importance of this objective may be seen 
by considering the evidence of volume. For the 
years 1998 to 2000 there were over 70,000 
violation tickets disputed annually under the 
Act. In one twelve-month period there were 
over 40,000 trials on traffic related matters, 
above, before a Justice of the Peace. Tickets 
are issued and disputed across the province of 
British Columbia, from north to south, east to 
west. The detachment areas of the Royal 
Canadian Mounted Police in which the police 
act as both prosecutor and witness are 
numerous, and include many, if not most, of the 
less populated areas of the province. It is 
obvious that a simple and efficient 
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enforcement system, both in terms of money 
and administrative detail, is required. I have 
no hesitation in agreeing with the summary 
conviction appeal judge that the administrative 
efficiency and cost effectiveness objectives 
are important.  
 
But there is more to the objective. The 
intention is also to provide a fair and balanced 
system. In the context of such a large volume 
of trials on relatively minor matters, fairness 
and balance are in part achieved and access to 
justice is enhanced, by an expeditious and 
relatively inexpensive process, provided always 
that the core hallmark of a fair trial, an 
opportunity to make full answer and defence 
before an independent and impartial tribunal, 
is maintained. [27-29] 
 
The nature of the offences was also an 
important aspect of the s.1 analysis. The trial 
was not criminal and conviction did not create a 
criminal record. Nor was a person’s liberty at 
risk. There was only risk of a fine or other 
impact through the licensing system.  
 
Finally, it was not necessary to have a second 
officer attend and prosecute a ticket as 
suggested by the accused. Justice Saunders 
wrote: 
 
Given the volume of tickets disputed, and the 
number of detachments that make full use of 
the impugned practice, one can say with 
confidence that a requirement that a second 
officer attend each trial to act as prosecutor 
will have the effect of reducing enforcement 
resources available for other duties, will 
increase expenditures, will require more 
officers to leave their detachment area to 
attend court, will increase administrative 
processes, and will create scheduling issues. 
Such consequences are significant. They go 
beyond simply a question of money into 
questions of community safety and expeditious 
resolution of the disputes, and they 
demonstrate, in my view, the importance of the 
impugned practice to the scheme as a whole. 
That is, I consider that the impugned practice 
is rationally connected to the objectives of the 
larger scheme. [para. 32] 
 
The practice of having an enforcement officer 
assume dual roles as both a prosecutor and 
witness at a trial for regulatory offences with 
minor consequences was demonstrably justified 
under s.1 of the Charter and the appeal was 
dismissed.   
 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca 
 
FOLLOWING DRIVER INTO 
PARKING GARAGE LAWFUL 
R. v. Clarke,  
(2005) Docket:C42410 (OntCA) 
 
Police officers saw a car make a 
right turn without signaling 
about a block ahead of them. 
The officers caught up to the 
car and activated their lights and sounded their 
air horn. The accused stopped briefly, but 
turned into the underground parking garage of 
an apartment building. He rolled down his window 
to activate the door opener and proceeded into 
the garage. The police followed and the accused 
backed into the police car causing minor damage.  
 
The accused had an odour of alcohol on his 
breath and exhibited signs of intoxication. A 
roadside screening test was administered and 
the accused failed. He was arrested for over 80 
mg% and advised of his right to a lawyer. After 
speaking to counsel, the accused provided two 
samples of his breath and he was charged with 
driving with more than 80 mg%.  
 
At trial in the Ontario Court of Justice the 
accused was convicted. Among other issues, the 
trial judge found the accused had not been 
arbitrarily detained nor subject to an 
unreasonable search. The failure to signal his 
turn had attracted the attention of the 
officers, which was the reason for the stop. As 
for entering the underground parking lot, the 
trial judge ruled that although the accused had 
an expectation of privacy he could not use his 
property as a sanctuary to avoid apprehension 
for his immediately preceding conduct. She also 
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found that the police had implied consent to 
enter the garage and were not trespassing 
because they were not asked to leave. 
 
The accused successfully appealed to the 
Ontario Superior Court of Justice and his 
conviction was set aside. Among several Charter 
breaches, the appeal justice found the officers 
were not close enough to be affected by the 
accused’s non-signalled turn; therefore it was 
not an offence under Ontario law. The ensuing 
detention was thus arbitrary since the police had 
no authority to stop the accused. As a 
consequence, the police had no authority to 
enter the parking garage—an element of the 
accused’s dwelling—and the resulting breath 
samples violated his s.8 Charter rights. The 
Charter breaches were serious and the breath 
samples were not admissible. An acquittal was 
entered. 
 
The Crown then appealed to the Ontario Court of 
Appeal arguing, in part, that the accused was not 
arbitrarily detained nor subject to an 
unreasonable search and seizure.  
 
The Detention 
 
Section 142(1) of Ontario’s Highway Traffic Act 
does not create an offence for failure to signal a 
turn unless another vehicle may be affected. It 
reads as follows: 
 
s.142(1) Highway Traffic Act 
The driver or operator of a vehicle upon a highway 
before turning to the left or right at any 
intersection or into a private road or driveway or 
from one lane for traffic to another lane for traffic 
or to leave the roadway shall first see that the 
movement can be made in safety, and if the 
operation of any other vehicle may be affected by 
the movement shall give a signal plainly visible to the 
driver or operator of the other vehicle of the 
intention to make the movement. [emphasis added] 
 
To make out an offence under this section it is 
only necessary to show that another vehicle may 
be affected by the movement, not that another 
vehicle was actually affected. In this case, the 
trial judge found that the police car was in the 
vicinity that may have been affected by the 
movement of the accused’s vehicle.  
 
Moreover, the police may stop motorists at 
random for highway safety reasons whether or 
not they have reasonable grounds to believe 
highway legislation has been violated. Justice 
Sharpe, writing the opinion of the court, stated: 
 
The [accused] in this case was not pulled over 
at random. Rather, he was stopped by police 
officers who had observed him driving in a 
manner which was capable of giving them 
reasonable grounds to believe a Highway 
Traffic Act offence had been committed. 
Accordingly, even if, contrary to the findings 
of the trial judge, the [accused] committed no 
offence when he failed to signal his turn, it is 
my view that as the police were acting within 
the lawful scope of their authority pursuant to 
s. 216(1) [of the Highway Traffic Act] when 
they demanded that he stop. 
 
I do not accept the [accused’s] submission 
that we should approach this case on the basis 
that the police purported to arrest the 
[accused] for an offence that does not exist in 
law. There is an offence of failing to signal a 
turn and that is what the police, on reasonable 
grounds, thought he had done. Even if the 
Crown was unable to establish that the police 
car was close enough to be a vehicle affected 
by the movement, to justify the actions of the 
police, the Crown only needs to prove the 
existence of reasonable grounds, not the 
actual commission of the offence. 
 
The [accused’s] failure to stop pursuant to the 
s. 216(2) provided the police with grounds to 
arrest him pursuant to s. 217(2). Accordingly, 
subject to my analysis of the second issue 
relating to the police entry into the parking 
garage, I conclude that the summary conviction 
appeal judge erred in finding that the 
respondent had been arbitrarily detained. [para. 
25-27] 
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The Parking Garage Entry 
 
Regardless of whether the police were allowed 
to enter the garage under the implied licence 
doctrine, they were allowed to follow the 
accused into the garage. Justice Sharpe held: 
 
…As I have already concluded, the [accused’s] 
failure to stop when directed to do so by the 
police constituted an offence for which the 
[accused] could be arrested without a warrant 
pursuant to s. 217(2). This was one continuous 
transaction with the police in constant pursuit. 
The [accused] could not thwart their demand 
that he stop by escaping to the sanctuary of his 
garage. The parking garage was an element of 
the respondent’s dwelling but, as the trial judge 
found, one does not have the same reasonable 
expectation of privacy in such a parking garage 
as one has in one’s dwelling. In the 
circumstances of this case, if the police were 
entitled to demand that he stop his vehicle on 
the street, they were entitled to pursue it into 
his garage when he failed to comply with their 
demand…[para. 29, references omitted] 
 
Since the police lawfully entered the parking 
garage, their subsequent conduct in obtaining 
breath samples was valid. 
 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca 
 
UNLAWFUL ARREST NOT 
NECESSARILY AN ARBITRARY 
DETENTION 
R. v. Wilson, 2005 BCPC 0014 
 
A police officer attempted to 
stop a vehicle reported as a 
possible impaired driver, but 
the accused would not pull over 
for 4-5 minutes until the 
officer pulled in front of her and cut her off. 
She was arrested for failing to stop, her vehicle 
was impounded, and she was transported to the 
police detachment. She was booked into cells and 
not released until morning, about eight hours 
after the arrest. During that time the accused 
was seen by EHS after complaining of shortness 
or breath and chest pains.  
 
At trial in British Columbia Provincial Court, the 
officer testified he kept her overnight because 
her vehicle had been towed, she had nowhere to 
stay, she was suffering from the condition that 
led to EHS being called, the weather was 
inclement and she was acting strange. Despite 
these reasons the accused argued she had been 
arbitrarily detained and that a judicial stay of 
proceedings should be entered. 
 
Justice Auxier first ruled the arrest unlawful. 
Under s.495(2) of the Criminal Code an arrest is 
“not to be done if the officer believes, on 
reasonable grounds, that the public interest may 
be satisfied without so arresting the person,”  
he stated. Examples of public interest include 
establishing identity, securing and preserving 
evidence, and preventing the continuation, 
repetition, or commission of an offence. 
However, Justice Auxier found none of those 
conditions existed. The officer knew the 
accused’s identity, had no evidence to secure or 
preserve, had no concern about her continuing to 
drive since her car had been impounded, and had 
no grounds to believe she would show up for 
court. 
 
An unlawful arrest, however, is not necessary 
arbitrary. Justice Auxier ruled: 
 
…In the case before me, the officer canvassed 
with [the accused] if she had any friends or 
family in the area who might assist her. She 
didn’t. There were no shelters available in the 
community. There was no ferry still running at 
that hour, even assuming the accused could 
have found transportation to take her to the 
ferry. The weather was inclement. She had 
just suffered some shortness of breath and 
chest pains, requiring attendance from EHS. 
So the officer’s decision was hardly capricious 
or despotic or unjustified. [para. 22] 
 
Since there was no arbitrary detention and thus 
no Charter breach there was no reason to enter 
a judicial stay. 
 
Complete case available at www.provincialcourt.bc.ca 
 30            www.jibc.bc.ca Volume 5 Issue 3 
  May/June 2005 
ACCUSED NOT A ‘KNOWN’ IN 
POLICE PROJECT:  
INTERCEPTS ADMISSIBLE 
R. v. Chow, 2005 SCC 24 
 
The accused, along with two 
others, were charged with first 
degree murder. The Crown’s 
tendered private communication 
intercepted during eleven 
successive authorizations. The accused was first 
named as a target in the third authorization and 
the calls related to the murder were intercepted 
during the sixth and seventh authorizations.  
 
At his trial in the Supreme Court of British 
Columbia the trial judge admitted the evidence 
after finding no Charter breaches under s.8. 
Under s.185(1)(e) of the Criminal Code an 
affidavit for the interception of private 
communications must disclose the existence of 
known persons whose conversations are targeted 
or any ensuing interceptions of their 
communication will be rendered unlawful. It 
reads: 
 
s.185(1)(e) Criminal Code 
An application for an authorization…shall be made ex 
parte and in writing…and shall be accompanied by an 
affidavit, which may be sworn on the information and 
belief of a peace officer or public officer deposing to 
the following matters…(e) the names, addresses and 
occupations, if known, of all persons, the interception 
of whose private communications there are reasonable 
grounds to believe may assist the investigation of the 
offence…[emphasis added] 
 
Although there was much evidence indicating 
that the police ought to have known the accused 
was a target, the Crown was not relying on any 
interceptions the accused was not a named 
target found the judge. As well, each 
authorization was a separate order and its 
legality was independently determined; earlier 
authorizations had no bearing on the 
admissibility of subsequent intercepts.  
 
On appeal to the British Columbia Court of 
Appeal, the court found the wiretaps had been 
properly admitted. The accused then appealed to 
the Supreme Court of Canada arguing, in part, 
that the trial judge erred in admitting the 
intercepted communications. In his view, his 
existence and relevance to the investigation was 
known at its outset and he should have been 
named in the first and second applications. 
Moreover, he submitted that the third and 
subsequent authorizations rested on the 
information obtained form the second 
authorization and therefore were inadmissible.  
 
Justice Fish, authoring the unanimous Supreme 
Court of Canada judgment, dismissed the appeal. 
When the first and second authorizations were 
made, some officers knew the accused was 
involved in criminal activity but were unaware of 
his connection to the illegal cocaine and heroin 
trafficking project under investigation. During 
the second authorization a connection was made 
between the accused and another target of the 
authorization. The accused was then 
appropriately named as a target in the third 
authorization. As a result, the accused’s privacy 
was not violated and the appeal was dismissed. 
 
Complete case available at www.scc-csc.gc.ca 
 
POLICE MAY LEGITIMATELY 
PERSUADE ARRESTEE TO TALK 
R. v. Edmondson, 2005 SKCA 51 
 
The accused was arrested two 
days after a 12 year old girl was 
sexually assaulted. He was 
informed of his right to remain 
silent and of his right to retain and instruct 
counsel without delay. He was transported to the 
police detachment where he told the officer he 
would like to call his father. This was permitted 
along with a phone call to his lawyer, which 
lasted about nine minutes. He was advised by his 
lawyer of his right to remain silent and not to 
speak to police. The accused then told the police 
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LEGAL LINGO 
Quid Pro Quo—something for
something; a party receives or
is promised something in return
for something they promise. 
what his lawyer said, but he was taken to an 
interview room, engaged in conversation, and 
persuaded to make a statement. The officer 
made the following suggestions: 
 
The officer went on to suggest that what had 
happened was probably a spur of the moment 
thing because it seemed out of character for 
[the accused]. He then said that there were 
two sides to every story and that he needed to 
hear [the accused’s] side… 
……… 
The officer continued, saying he could not 
make any promises or threats, for that would 
be against the law, and suggesting it was "time 
for the truth." 
……… 
With that, the discussion turned to bail. The 
police officer suggested the police would 
release [the accused] on bail but not 
immediately, assuring him the police would be 
talking to the other two men and suggesting to 
him that it would be well for the officer to 
have [the accused’s] side of the story. 
……… 
At this juncture [the accused] suggested that 
perhaps he should talk to his father again, to 
which the officer responded, "I think you 
talked to enough people." The officer then 
asked [the accused] what time he had to be at 
work. "Three o'clock," [the accused] replied. 
……… 
The officer continued, commenting on the 
seriousness of the matter, on [the accused’s] 
apparent good character, and on the officer's 
role in the investigation of the occurrence. He 
told [the accused] that the girl was not in a 
bad way physically, was scheduled for release 
from hospital that day, and that there may 
have been several things in play. He suggested 
[the accused] may have been drinking, reacting 
to peer pressure, responding to the girl having 
come-on to him, and so on, saying that for all 
he knew the girl might have been the 
aggressor…. 
……… 
The officer went on appeal to [the accused’s] 
sound upbringing and generally lawful 
behaviour, suggesting again that what had 
occurred seemed out of character and that 
[the accused] may not have been at fault. And 
again he suggested that [the accused] give him 
his version of the story, reminding him that he 
had been identified as one of three men 
involved, that he seemed to have been the 
primary actor, and that the other men were 
likely to talk about what had happened. [The 
accused] wanted to know who had identified 
him and, when told, asked if the others had 
also been identified. The officer told him the 
police had names and descriptions of the 
others, and urged him to be honest.[paras. 14-
19, transcript portions omitted] 
 
At his trial in the Saskatchewan Court of 
Queen’s Bench, the trial judge admitted the 
statement. In his view the police strategies—
including overstating the strength of the 
evidence, minimizing or understating the 
seriousness of the offence, suggesting he should 
help himself, playing on his lapse of judgment and 
good family background—did not create an 
atmosphere of oppression or inducement 
sufficient to exclude the statement. Nor was 
the reference to bail a 
quid pro quo offer. The 
statement met the 
threshold requirement 
for voluntariness.  
 
As for the accused’s right to silence (s.7 
Charter), the trial judge found there had been 
no violations despite this case being close to the 
line. The statement and a videotaped interview 
were admitted as evidence and a jury convicted 
the accused. 
 
The accused appealed to the Saskatchewan 
Court of Appeal arguing, among other grounds, 
that the trial judge erred in admitting the 
incriminating statement. The unanimous 
Saskatchewan Court of Appeal, however, 
disagreed.  
 
A statement made by an accused to a person in 
authority will be admissible if the Crown proves 
beyond a reasonable doubt that it was voluntary. 
In holding that the trial judge did not err in this 
respect, Justice Cameron wrote: 
 
…The accused was fully aware of his rights, 
and there is little if anything to suggest the 
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police officer subjected him to any form of 
harsh, aggressive, or overbearing 
interrogation. Nor did the officer make any 
improper promise or threat, or offer any 
improper inducement. [para. 28] 
 
Unlike the voluntariness rule, when a Charter 
right is at issue the accused—not the Crown—
bears the burden of proof, on a balance of 
probabilities, that their Charter right was 
breached. In this case, the accused did not meet 
that burden. In addressing the right to silence 
issue, Justice Cameron stated: 
 
…we note that the accused was in no position 
to satisfy the trial judge that he did not know 
he could remain silent. He was informed of his 
right to silence, first by the police when they 
arrested him, and then by counsel. Indeed, 
counsel advised him to exercise his right to 
silence by saying nothing to the police. That 
being so, and having regard for the trial 
judge's findings in relation to the maturity and 
intelligence of the accused, the accused can 
hardly be said to have established that he did 
not know he had the choice of speaking to the 
police officer or not. So the question reduces 
to whether that choice was somehow vitiated 
by the conduct of the officer taking the 
statement: Did the techniques of persuasion 
employed by the officer cross the line?  
 
In keeping with R. v. Hebert [[1990] 2 S.C.R. 
151] the police officer was not obliged to 
protect the accused against making a 
statement if he chose to do so. Indeed, it was 
open to the officer to use legitimate 
persuasion to encourage [the accused] to 
choose to talk about what had occurred, and to 
do so in the absence of counsel. As noted in 
Hebert, at p. 184, "police persuasion short of 
denying the suspect the right to choose or 
depriving him of an operating mind, does not 
breach the right to silence.” 
 
The police officer used several persuasive 
techniques to encourage [the accused] to talk. 
He began by suggesting it was necessary for 
him to find out what had happened-bearing in 
mind there are always two sides to every 
story-and necessary for him to collect 
evidence pertaining to both sides of the story. 
There can be nothing objectionable about this, 
notwithstanding the fact that the police 
officer knew that the accused had been 
advised by counsel to say nothing and that the 
officer's aim was to overcome that advice, in 
the sense of persuading the accused to talk 
despite counsel's advice not to do so…Nor can 
there be anything objectionable about the 
police officer's later suggestions that it was 
time for the truth; that he was going to be 
talking to the others; that the occurrence 
seemed out of character; or that he needed 
the accused's version of events to assess the 
situation and draw the requisite conclusions. 
Again, these were legitimate forms of 
persuasion. 
 
Later, the police officer played upon the 
strength of what he supposedly knew, 
suggesting the information incriminated the 
accused in particular but allowing as how the 
matter might simply have gotten out of hand, 
and understandably so. He followed up by an 
appeal for honesty and for further information 
in the interests of a complete investigation, 
suggesting that for all he knew the accused 
might have been acting innocently. He then 
repeated his request for the accused's side of 
the story, suggesting that the accused help 
himself out, as his friends were apt to do when 
they talked to the police, and reminding the 
accused that the truth would ultimately 
emerge. He went on to ask the accused to take 
him through what had happened, step by step, 
assuring him the police were going to talk to 
everyone involved and evaluate the situation in 
light of the whole. Once again these were 
legitimate means of persuasion, aimed as 
always at persuading the accused to talk 
despite counsel's advice to the contrary. 
[paras. 30-33] 
 
The accused knew he had the choice to talk to 
the police or not. They simply persuaded him to 
talk through legitimate means. The appeal was 
dismissed. 
 
Complete case available at www.lawsociety.sk.ca 
 
